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What kind of weapon systems could trigger a nuclear war? Answer: A weapon system so vulnerable so certain to be taken out by a first strike by the adversary that it must be fired on warning or lose it. Of course, the warning may be false. This country has already experienced some close calls, some serious indications that adversary missiles were on their way. Fortunately for the fate of the world, the good Lord was with us. We discovered the warnings were false, in time. But the time is only a few minutes. The President must make a swift decision on firing or not firing the MX. We will have to make a terribly swift decision because the MX is so vulnerable in its stationary mode, and with its tempting target of 10 warheads, the President would have to decide whether to "use it or lose it."

I challenge any Senator who disagrees with this analysis to tell me how I have erred in describing the circumstances under which the MX would be used. Would the President wait until accurate, hard target Soviet warheads had struck MX bases in the hope that the hardening of the bases had done the job? That is the forlorn answer the secretary of Defense was given. Any familiarity with the old Minuteman silos in which the MX would rest tells us just how forlorn that hope of MX survival is.

Regardless of who is President of the United States when the MX missiles are deployed and the first warning of a nuclear attack has convinced a President that we are threatened with the real thing, the President would surely have to make the painful "use it or lose it" decision for the MX. The President could tell his submarine commanders and bomber pilots to break off their attack mission. But once the MX is launched, there goes good old Mother Earth.

Second, the MX is a first strike weapon. President Reagan, Secretary Weinberger and previous top officials of our Government have flatly forsworn the notion that we would engage in a first preemptive strike against the Soviet Union. I believe them. We might blunder into a nuclear war by using tactical nuclear weapons that could escalate swiftly to a full scale nuclear exchange later up the line. But a bolt from the U.S. blue against the Soviet Union before any Soviet attack on the United States? No. Never. Yes I believe President Reagan is sincere in his denial that he would never initiate such a strike. I believe no other future President would take such an action. So we will not strike first with the MX. That is not the problem. The problem is how the Russians will view an MX.

Put yourself in the position of Russian leaders. They know we have an immense and largely invulnerable nuclear striking capability in our quiet and invisible submarines and our swift moving bombers. They know we keep a far larger proportion of our submarine

fleet and our bomber force at sea and in the air than they do. They also know that both our submarine fleet and our bomber- force is far more heavily armed with nuclear warheads than their bombers and submarines. What does all this means? It means the Soviets know we have a massive nuclear deterrent, right now, today, without the MX, much of which they cannot possibly reach. And they know that we know they recognize the invulnerability of 75 percent of our nuclear deterrent.

They also know we have under development for the near future a new D-5, hard target kill missile which will have far greater accuracy and kill capacity than anything we have had before. That D-5 can be launched by our Trident submarines.

Now if you are a Russian military leader what do you ask yourself when you see the United States pushing the MX missiles on top of this overpowering new hard target kill capacity from invulnerable submarines? Don't you ask: "What can the Americans use the MX for that they cannot accomplish far more surely with a D-5 missile fired from the submarines we cannot reach?" The answer is that the MX can only really be justified as an addition to the American nuclear arsenal as a first strike—that is a preemptive strike at the Soviet Union or as a "fire on warning" destabilizer.

So the MX is indeed a mistake. It is indeed no asset, no matter how it is dressed up as a bargaining chip. It is clearly a destabilizing weapon system. The Russians will certainly view it as a first preemptive strike threat. They will do so because, as they consider the American nuclear arsenal that faces them, they see an impressive array of largely invulnerable submarine and bomber missiles, enough, and then some, to retaliate with an absolutely devastating strike against any Russian attack on the United States. But now we are adding a 10 warhead, land based, stationary missile that can only supplement the current American nuclear power as a first strike.

The Russians may be confident that this is one American missile they can surely take out with their own preemptive attack. In the light of all this, does the MX contribute to the security of our country? Does it make peace more likely between the armed-to-theteeth nuclear superpowers? Of course not. If the Congress votes again for the MX, it is voting to move a long way down the road away from stability and toward the terrible prospect of an all out nuclear war.

## GUATEMALAN INDIANS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, over the past few years, Guatemala has been committing incredible atrocities against its Indian population. Thousands of people have been shot, hanged, or have simply disappeared.

fleet and our bomber force at sea and in the air than they do. They also supposedly being "guerrilla villages."

In "Witness to Genocide," Thomas Anderson and Craig Nelson, two experts on Latin American politics, use testimony of refugees to detail Government atrocities. Most of the witnesses are Indians from the Guatemalan Province of Huehuetenango.

They tell of children's throats being slit and of women being hit with machetes. Animals were slaughtered, and villages were burned to the ground in a futile search for guerrilla strongholds. Rivers and streams, sources of drinking water were poisoned. Forests were destroyed with incendiary grenades dropped from helicopters.

Anderson and Nelson interviewed 23 refugees. Together they report hundreds of killings. One man told of how Guatemalan troops hanged his brother and hacked him to death with a machete. Hundreds of refugees have similar stories. Since so many killings occurred without witnesses, it is impossible to say how many Indians died at the hands of Government troops. The lowest casualty estimate for Huehuetanango Province alone is 3,000. Fires and bombings make many bodies untraceable.

Is it not ironic that Guatemala has ratified the Genocide Convention while this Nation has not? Why should murderers and thugs stand on higher moral ground than the greatest Nation in the world? We should be able to condemn Guatemala without any question about our own commitment to human rights. Let us lessen the Guatemalans' moral ammunition and ratify the Genocide Convention now.

## S. 924—MANDATORY WORKFARE REQUIREMENT

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation which will require that all heads of households in two-parent families work as a condition of their welfare grant from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] Program.

I have long believed that a mandatory work requirement—often referred to as "workfare"—should exist across the board in our welfare programs and I introduced similar legislation in 1981 and, again in 1983. I do just that today.

This legislation is different, Mr. President, because this legislation would be for families with two heads of households. In other words, a mother and father. These programs have not worked in the past because by and large they have been applied to single-parent families, and of course in those circumstances it means that the single parent has to leave a child—often a small child—in order to work. That is a moral decision that sometimes is a very bad one.