

RECORD some comments about the next generation of technologies having potential as antisatellite [ASAT] systems, and quoted at some length from the Defense Department publication "Soviet Military Power, 1985," describing Soviet progress in these technologies. A key observation in this report, which I would like to quote again, was the following:

The Soviets apparently believe that these techniques offer greater promise for future antisatellite application than continued development of ground-based orbital interceptors equipped with conventional warheads.

Today I would like to make a few comments about satellite survivability and to quote one respected scientist, Dr. Robert Jastrow, who is a strong supporter of space defense systems, about the feasibility of defending our existing space assets.

First, I should like to make it quite clear, in the most emphatic terms, that the Soviet co-orbital ASAT does not constitute a serious threat to our space assets, even if it worked perfectly; and it has failed to work at all in its last series of tests, and has succeeded only about 50 percent of the time in its total test program. Even if it worked perfectly, it could not reach any of our critical early warning, communication, nuclear blast detection, or navigational satellites. It can reach, but not threaten, our low orbit observation and weather satellites, if these are designed for survivability, as described by Jastrow below.

As to our own proposed MHV-ASAT, it is equally limited in its threat. It is not able to reach very many of the critical Soviet satellites, and the GAO has indicated in earlier reports that, when fully deployed in the early 1990s, it would meet only 25 percent of the DOD's stated mission requirements. Its highest priority targets would be the low-orbit Soviet EORSAT and RORSAT, which are assumed to have naval targetting capabilities. Naval flag officers with whom I have discussed this capability state that conventional ECM—electronic countermeasure—procedures can be used to protect naval vessels from this threat.

Mr. Speaker, my colleagues and I, who support a moratorium on ASAT testing and a real and sincere effort to reach agreement with the Soviets on keeping weapons out of space, are equally eager to provide defense against attack and other survivability features for our own satellites. We support an amendment by our colleague, Congressman HOYER of Maryland, to provide additional funds for that purpose.

Mr. Speaker, I include below a few paragraphs from Dr. Jastrow's recent book discussing satellite defense and survivability.

#### HOW TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OBSOLETE (By Robert Jastrow)

The same circumstances that make a satellite a tempting target for destruction by one superpower also make it a valuable

asset to the other, and one to be defended at all cost. Fortunately for the side that is trying to protect its satellites in this contest, a satellite can be defended very well. It is sometimes said that satellites are very vulnerable to attack, more so than missiles. However, the reverse is true. A ship cannot be armored too heavily and still stay afloat; a missile cannot be loaded with too much shielding, or it will not get off the ground, but a satellite in orbit is weightless and can be armored as heavily as necessary, within reason, without adverse effects on its performance. A satellite can also be armed with its own weapons, to destroy any intruding satellite that approaches within lethal range. It can shoot down smart bullets with its own smart bullets. And it can be supplied with onboard rocket engines and a large supply of fuel, so that it can maneuver out of the path of an intruder.

Critical satellites can also be protected by placing them in very high orbits, out of the adversary's range. It would take several hours for a killer satellite or a smart bullet to climb 22,000 miles to the altitude of a geosynchronous satellite. That long period gives threatened satellites plenty of time to draw a bead on the approaching killer satellite and destroy it. Or, if the approaching intruder is a smart bullet that seems to be homing in with radar or heat detectors, the satellite under attack can wait until it is quite close and then nimbly step aside. Smart bullets have a limited maneuvering ability; they cannot make a sudden change of course to follow a last-minute change of course by their quarry.

An even greater measure of protection can be obtained by placing key satellites in orbits halfway to the moon, which could take the adversary's killer satellites twelve to twenty hours to reach. Some of the most important battle-management satellites, which would coordinate our defending satellite forces in the event of a massive Soviet missile attack, may be placed in these so-called cislunar orbits.

A satellite could also be protected at any altitude by the methods bomber and fighter pilots use to foil the enemy in aerial combat. If a smart bullet homes in on the satellite with a heat-sensitive instrument, a warm decoy can be tossed out to the side to distract the instrument. If a satellite senses it is being probed by a radar beam—indicating that a killer satellite is stalking it—the satellite under attack can analyze the radar beam and send back spurious pulses that tell the killer satellite, "I'm not here, I'm over there."

Some of these stratagems can also be used by Soviet missiles to evade our defense. Decoy warheads—lightweight imitations of the real warhead—are a particularly useful ploy because we must find a method of discriminating between the decoy and the real warhead, or waste our resources by trying to shoot down everything in sight. However, the number of decoys a missile can deploy is limited by the fact that the missile must rise up against gravity; it cannot carry too much excess baggage in the form of decoys or any other protective device. A satellite, being weightless in orbit, does not have this restriction.

Instruments to detect an adversary's attempts at mischief—the probing radar beam, the laser beam, or the hit scored by a smart bullet—are being installed on U.S. military satellites now under construction, so that in the future we will know when our key satellites have come under attack.

The newest satellite models also are being hardened or protected against the effects of nuclear explosions in space. These explosions generate a pulse of electrical voltage that can burn out radios and hair dryers

across a continent and also put a nation's entire satellite fleet out of action. Some defense experts believe that nuclear explosions in space, disabling our satellites by damaging their electronic circuits, will be the first step in a nuclear attack on the United States. However, a thin metal casing around the critical electronic parts can shield the satellite from this effect. Increasing reliance on fiber optics—thin glass wires that replace the electronic circuits in satellites by using pulses of light instead of electricity—can eliminate that problem entirely.

Proliferation is another stratagem available to the defense for the protection of its satellites. This means, for example, putting a silent spare in orbit, which never reveals its presence to the adversary by talking to receiving stations on the ground, but only talks to other American satellites. Hidden in space, the silent spare is instantly available to take over the duties of a satellite that has been hit.

Armor, guns, maneuverability, spoofing, proliferation—these are time-honored methods for protecting valued military assets. They have not been used in space because no one is shooting at today's satellites yet. Tomorrow's satellites will be another story. ●

#### FAILURE OF THE MIND

HON. ROBERT K. DORNAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 25, 1985

● Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, I have on many occasions risen in defense of the foreign policy of the United States against those colleagues of mine who feel the need to blame America first for the woes of the world. These colleagues decry nearly every foreign policy action that the president takes and continually compare our actions with activities of the Soviet Union. These vicious attacks try to portray the United States and the Soviet Union as "moral equivalents." I have argued long and hard that there is a sharp difference between the slave-masters in the Soviet Union and the democratically elected presidents of the United States. There is a difference in circumstances, intentions and results. But I have never been able to put it quite so eloquently as Philip Gold has done in today's Washington Times. As Mr. Gold points out there is a obvious difference between Afghanistan and Grenada. If we cannot make the distinction between these two invasions, then as Gold puts it, "there is no essential difference between what a bridegroom does on his wedding night and what a rapist does in an alley." Mr. Speaker, I submit Mr. Gold's article for the Record and encourage every Member of Congress to read this truly insightful piece. Some of you should commit it to memory.

#### FAILURE OF THE MIND

The argument has been around for quite some time. It is currently known as "moral equivalence," and consists of a single assertion that there is no fundamental difference between the global roles and actions of the

United States and those of the Soviet Union and its surrogates.

Many different types of people make this argument. Some are simply professional American-haters, working out. Others, rather often the aging residue of the '60s New Left, have a more personal stake; they have the past to come to terms with, and "moral equivalence" helps them evade the obligation of mature introspection.

Still others on the contemporary left, having despaired of ever justifying communism on its merits, now try to do it by the novel technique of blanket condemnation. As a rule, these are also the folks who manage to explain away communism's outrages while simultaneously demanding that the United States adhere to impossibly high standards of international morality (assuming that slow suicide can be so designated). And still others merely wish to be shocking.

I no longer take the time to argue with the "moral equivalence" crowd life being short and indifference as good a response to irrationality as any.

On occasion, I even agree. Of course, there's no essential difference between Grenada and Afghanistan: both were invasions. True, just as there is no essential difference between what a bridegroom does on his wedding night and what a rapist does in an alley. After all, it's the act that matters, not the circumstances, or intentions or results (some feminist would no doubt agree).

But more often these days, when encountering "moral equivalence," I find myself thinking of a little-known book I discovered in graduate school, a short book written by a truly great man.

The name Marc Bloch means nothing to most Americans. By profession, Mr. Bloch was medievalist at the Sorbonne, one of the leaders in his esoteric field. But Mr. Bloch was also a soldier. He fought in World War I, winning a battlefield commission and four decorations for courage under fire.

When World War II broke out, Mr. Bloch refused the mobilization exemption he rated as a man in his 50's and the father of four minor children. But because he had neglected his reserve training, he was recalled at his old rank. He was, he liked to claim, the oldest captain in the French Army.

Following the German victory, Mr. Bloch went home. He spent the summer and fall of 1940 writing a book which he probably never expected to see published. The book represented his private attempt to understand the catastrophe. He entitled it *Strange Defeat*.

According to Mr. Bloch, the French disaster had been primarily a failure of mind: not simply of the military mind, but of the entire national intellect. True, the Germans had thought out and implemented a new form of warfare while the French had remained addicted to outmoded concepts and techniques. But, Mr. Bloch discerned a greater failure—a national inability to understand that, whatever the flaws of French society, there was a basic difference between them and their enemies.

As Mr. Bloch wrote of the "moral equivalence" of his day.

"They said that French capitalism was a hard taskmaster; and in that they were certainly not wrong. But what they forgot was that victory for the totalitarian regimes would be bound to lead to the complete enslavement of the workers. . . . They taught, not without reason, that war builds up a mass of useless destruction. But they omitted to distinguish between a war which men have deliberately undertaken and a war imposed from without, between murder and legitimate self-defense. . . . They maintained that war is the concern of the rich and powerful, that the poor should have nothing to

do with it. As though, in an old society, cemented by centuries of a shared culture, the humble are not always, for good or ill, constrained to make common cause with the mighty. They whispered—I have heard them—that Hitler was not nearly so black as he was painted. . . . How, I wonder, do these noble apostles feel today?"

After finishing *Strange Defeat*, Marc Bloch joined the resistance. Four years later he was captured, tortured, and executed, his death as much the result of the "moral equivalence" of his countrymen as of a Nazi firing squad. He left as his intellectual legacy a half dozen volumes of medieval history, all now classics in the field.

And one small book of perhaps a broader relevance. ●

## VIETNAM VETERANS' FORUM

HON. BOB EDGAR

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 25, 1985

● Mr. EDGAR. Mr. Speaker, I want to bring to the attention of the Members of the House of Representatives the testimony of James Foster of the San Francisco Health Commission at a recent Vietnam Veterans' Forum held by the House Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee on Hospitals and Health Care. His testimony is an eloquent statement of how a dedicated health department is attempting to meet the health care needs of some of our most unfortunate citizens; those who are homeless and often suffering from physical and mental illnesses and those who are aging. The difficulties he describes are to a large extent results of the reductions in health care funds and major shifts in the emphasis of Federal support for health care and health care funding for the medically indigent.

I am pleased that H.R. 505, a bill I introduced and which has been passed by the House, responds to some of the needs expressed at the forum and by Mr. Foster with regard to encouraging the VA and communities to work together to meet health care needs and to improving opportunities for non-institution-based health care. The testimony of Mr. Foster follows:

### THE DEPARTMENT OVERVIEW

(By James Foster, San Francisco Health Commission)

I am speaking today on behalf of the City and County of San Francisco, and its Department of Public Health, as well as on behalf of its residents who require our services.

These are both exciting and difficult times in health care, whether the issue is the outbreak of AIDS, the crisis in Mental Health Services, or the profound changes in the reimbursement strategies being adopted to contain health care costs.

The mission of the San Francisco Department of Public Health is to provide leadership in health systems improvement, promote a safe and healthful environment, and provide a high quality continuum of efficient and effective health care services which address the preventive and curative health needs of San Francisco residents.

In addition to this basic philosophical commitment, the Department operates

within certain legal mandates to provide services. Most notably Sec. 17000 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, which mandates indigent care services.

San Francisco's Department of Public Health has one of the broadest scopes of programs of any county in the country. The Department discharges its responsibilities through a comprehensive and integrated health care delivery system that includes San Francisco General Hospital, Laguna Honda Hospital, Community Mental Health Services, Community Substance Abuse Services, Forensic Services, Emergency Medical Services, Community Public Health Services, and a wide range of programs that cut across specific-service boundaries.

In the provision of health services, the Department frequently works in cooperation with other governmental and private agencies.

Examples of cooperative working relationships that have resulted in the development of new program areas are; the Office of Senior Health Services has worked closely with the Commission on Aging, the Department of Social Services, the Downtown Senior Center and the San Francisco Housing Authority to develop a comprehensive range of health and social services for senior residents in San Francisco. The dramatic outbreak of AIDS required an unprecedented and immediate response involving a diversity of health and social support services. The AIDS Activity Office has been responsible for coordinating services with the Department of Social Services, AIDS Foundation, Haight-Ashbury Free Clinic, Garden Sullivan Hospital, Hospice of San Francisco, Shanti Project and the AIDS Health Project. The Department was recently awarded a \$1.4 million grant from The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and Pew Memorial Trust to provide health care to the homeless, a project that is the product of joint efforts of the Department, The Mayor's Task Force on the homeless and a broad array of community agencies providing services to the homeless.

### SF HOMELESS—PROBLEM STATEMENT

Despite repeated effort to estimate the numbers of homeless persons in San Francisco, it is not known how many people are actually homeless in the city. It is evident, however, that the number of homeless persons has dramatically increased in recent years.

Surveys of persons using the emergency shelters revealed some demographic characteristics of the persons using emergency shelters, and these have been submitted for your review. Although surveys indicated varying percentages, it is clear that 30 percent to 50 percent of the homeless people using emergency shelters are veterans, although veterans only comprise 11 percent of the general population.

In a recent study entitled "The Challenge to The V.A. Health System" authored by Donald L. Custis, M.D., former Chief Medical Director of the V.A. in which he states that when the mandated means test was last applied, "over 98 percent of the non-service connected patients were indeed in the poverty class". Currently one-half of all VA health care systems outpatients and two-thirds of all inpatients are veterans with non-service connected disabilities.

We would like to note that all care for non-service connected veterans is contingent upon space and resource availability. We, as county providers "of last resort", however, are seeing an increasing number of indigents of which a large population are homeless veterans, and upwards of 70 percent of these, veterans manifest disabling condi-