

The Michel-McCurdy amendment offers that minimum support, a mere \$27 million.

We spend more than that on Senate campaigns in some States.

The Pentagon spends that much for toilet seats, screw drivers, and ashtrays.

Yesterday, with very little fanfare, we voted \$2 billion for two countries in the Middle East that are not even at war. And that was a bonus in addition to the regular funds appropriated under the Foreign Assistance Act.

What we are talking about for the freedom fighters in Nicaragua is peanuts by our standards.

Yet, we are afraid we might be overreacting by giving those who are willing to die for a cause that is fundamental to most Americans a piddling \$27 million.

The Gephardt amendment is simply a cop-out.

It ties the white flag of surrender to the gun barrels of the freedom fighters and tells them to throw in the towel and get in the soup line.

A vote against Gephardt will be a vote for democracy and a vote against the policy of benign neglect.

I urge a no vote on this amendment.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. BARNES].

(Mr. BARNES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BARNES. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in very strong support of the amendment offered by our distinguished colleague from Missouri, Mr. GEPHARDT. I would like to just very briefly flesh out what the gentleman from Missouri was saying about the negotiations that are under way and why it is that our neighbors and friends and allies in the hemisphere are opposed to our acting today to finance the war that is ongoing in Nicaragua.

As everyone knows, the four Contadora countries, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia, have been engaged in the so-called "Contadora Initiative" trying to find a peaceful solution to the problems in Central America and to address the very concerns that we are hearing so eloquently spoken to today on both sides of the aisle.

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We all share the same concerns, and the Contadora nations share them, and that is why they undertook their initiative. They have drawn up, and by the way, this is information I have obtained from the State Department about the current status, from the Reagan administration I have obtained this information about the current status of the Contadora process.

The Contadora Group has drawn up five "documents" that seek to reconcile the September 1984 draft treaty which, as you will recall, the Nicara-

guans agreed to sign and the so-called Tegucigalpa draft subsequently drawn up by Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica, with the United States' participation, incorporating the changes that they wanted in the September draft.

Two of these documents, two of the five documents, pertain to verification, and three to security measures. The two verification documents were accepted in April by the five Central American countries, including Nicaragua, and one of the three security documents was accepted last month, in May, so three of the five documents have now been agreed to by all five of the Central American countries, as well as the four Contadora countries.

The other two security documents do contain some difficult issues, but negotiations are underway. Large numbers of diplomats from all nine countries are at work on those issues and they will be meeting shortly on them.

The September draft treaty was accompanied by a draft protocol which would have been open for signature by other nations. This was objected to, particularly by our country, which did not want the Cubans and the Soviets becoming a party to a Central American agreement.

The Contadora group has gone back to the table and has now drafted four new protocols to replace that earlier one that seek to resolve the problems with the first one. The first three have been agreed to. The first three of those four protocols have been agreed to. They would be open for, in the first instance, the Contadora countries, in the second by the members of the verification commission, and third, by other American states. The fourth protocol, which has not yet been agreed to, is still under negotiation and we are informed, as informed earlier today by the Government of Venezuela, that a meeting of the Contadora nations is scheduled within the next week at the ministerial level.

We are also informed by these countries who are engaged in these negotiations, which have already demonstrated substantial progress, frankly more than I and many others would have thought possible when the initiative was undertaken, that a vote by the Congress today to fund the Contras will seriously undermine if not destroy the diplomatic effort that they are making, countries that are democracies, friends of the United States who are engaged in a serious diplomatic effort.

The only hopes we have left this afternoon to give them the opportunity to achieve success are the Gephardt amendment, which I urge a vote for to give them at least 6 months to do so, or the Hamilton amendment, which I think is even better than Michel as amended by Gephardt because it clearly puts the imprimatur of the Congress behind the Contadora initiative.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LAGOMARSINO] a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(Mr. LAGOMARSINO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Yes; I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, those students of logic who just heard the last speaker, our dear from Maryland, talk, heard a prime example of what is called the fallacy of the false alternative. You cannot have negotiations and support the Contras at the same time. Nonsense. They go hand in hand.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Gephardt amendment.

The Gephardt amendment in effect reformulates the procedure adopted by the House last October in the continuing resolution, which put off any action in support of the democratic resistance in Nicaragua and says the best action is further inaction.

There has been no U.S. Government funding of the democratic resistance in Nicaragua for more than a year; if, as the Gephardt amendment presumes, there were any inclination on the part of the Sandinistas to negotiate, they could have taken advantage of the time during the past year to negotiate as requested by the bishops there. In fact, they could have easily demonstrated their sincerity in negotiating by expressing their interest during the bilateral talks with the United States at Manzanillo.

For that matter, you need only look at the actions of the Sandinistas since the vote in April to determine their sincerity. They told visiting congressional delegations they would have a moral obligation to institute liberalizing measures, using their words if Congress defeated aid to the Contras. The House defeated the aid, but the Sandinistas did anything but take liberalizing measures since that vote.

I would like to quote from the Managua Domestic Service dated April 23d.

Question. Commander Ortega, can you tell us something more about the proposal that you made and sent through the two Congressmen and that Mr. Shultz has described as a fraud?

Ortega. We were exchanging views with the Congressmen. The truth is that we have presented nothing new, as Mr. Shultz and President Reagan's spokesmen have tried to imply. Instead, we simply arranged the peace proposals that Nicaragua has always made.

Well, what has happened? Sandinista action since the vote has been more repressive internally and aggressive externally. Examples include:

Visit to Moscow.—On April 27, Ortega began a tour of Europe beginning with the Soviet Union. He was

gested warmly by the Soviet bloc and received a promise of increased Soviet shipments. This contrasts with the rather guarded reception he received from Western European capitals, apparently added on short notice after the public relations gaffe of visiting Moscow became obvious.

Labor repression.—An attempt by independent labor unions on May 1 to march peacefully to protest GON policies was violently broken up by government-sponsored mobs and armed police; on June 3, a number of strikers protesting GON suspension of payment in kind reportedly were beaten and arrested; on June 5 labor activists attempting to organize a protest strike were detained by authorities.

Press censorship.—Between April 10 and 24 censorship of *La Prensa* diminished, with only a single article censored on April 22 and 23. For 2 weeks following the vote, censorship continued fairly light, but in early May began to pick up again. On May 6 and June 5 the newspaper was unable to publish because of the number of articles and features forbidden for publication.

Human rights.—In response to the defection of a high ranking security official in March, GON has taken into custody the man's family, including a 3-year-old child; wife is a U.S. permanent resident. Family members from Costa Rica who attempted to visit detainees were arrested and harshly interrogated, and claim they were warned the family will never be released if the defector talks about his official activities in Nicaragua. At least 35 Nicaraguans have been arrested and most sentenced for anti-Sandinista political activities; charges have ranged from actual participation in resistance actions to providing military supplies to the armed opposition or assisting youths to leave the country to avoid military service. Sentences ranged from 3 to 30 years.

Support for subversives. On April 29, Defense Minister Ortega told the public that the Nicaraguan armed opposition had surface to air missiles, and warned that Salvadoran guerrillas might obtain similar weapons. On May 23 Nicaraguan dailies reported a meeting between Bayardo Arce, FSLN political section chief, and Guillermo Ungo, leader of the Salvadoran FDR/FMLN insurgents. Ungo told the press the Salvadoran guerrillas received moral support from Nicaragua, and termed such aid "legitimate."

Harassment of religious groups. The Nicaraguan State Telecommunications Agency cited "technical problems" for the failure to broadcast live the investiture of Archbishop Obando y Bravo as cardinal in Rome on May 25, despite repeated flawless tests of the satellite link-up shortly before the event; GON officials continued to withhold from intended recipients the humanitarian assistance brought to Nicaragua with GON approval by evangelist Larry Jones in mid-April. Rumors sug-

gested the GON had confiscated the goods for distribution by and to their own supporters.

Miskito Indian reconciliation talks. The last round of negotiations on May 25-26, led to complete breakdown in conciliation efforts, as GON rejected basic Miskito demands for political, autonomy, demilitarization of Miskito areas and third-party verification of agreement implementations. GON termed Miskito position as "arbitrary and absurd." Just prior to the congressional vote in April the GON had come to a preliminary agreement with the Miskito representatives that was publicized as evidence of the GON's good intentions.

Contadora. After having accepted a proposed revision of verification provisions at April 11-12 meeting of group, the Nicaraguans in May meeting backed off from previous positions: specifically, they rejected the concept of an international corps of inspectors as "unnecessary," insisted that decisions by the verification group be by unanimous agreement, and retreated from earlier support for the simultaneity aspect, thereby casting serious doubt on GON support for meaningful verification procedure.

Border violations. The most serious border violation occurred on May 31, when EPS troops crossed into Costa Rica and attacked a Costa Rican Civil Guard Patrol, killing two men. Despite direct contact with officers of the EPS, Costa Rican efforts to retrieve the body of one of the dead were impeded by heavy fire from EPS troops against the recovery teams, and the body was not retrieved until June 6. Nicaragua denied its involvement, but Costa Rica's own investigation left no doubt that the aggressors were members of the EPS. Prior to the incident the residents of the border region complained of Nicaraguan shelling of Costa Rican territory, and Nicaraguan aircraft reportedly carried out cross-border incursions. Nicaraguan military troops repeatedly violated Honduran territory during the late April to June period. In one incident on May 10 five Hondurans were killed. From May 4-6, several Honduran villages were shelled by Nicaraguan troops.

Internal reconciliation. GON officials continued to insist they will never negotiate with the armed opposition, and showed no indications they would consider negotiation with internal civic opposition either; following U.S. embargo, GON statements suggested political opposition would be closely watched to ensure support for Sandinista policies.

Some liberalizing measures! To assume that the Sandinistas wish to negotiate in good faith is to ignore the facts of their past attitude toward negotiations. Brooklyn Rivera, head of the Nicaraguan Indian rebel group Misurasata, tried for 8 months to negotiate with the Sandinistas, and all for nothing. When the talks broke down, Rivera said, "The dialog is

stalled because of the intransigence and inflexibility of the government in not recognizing the historical rights of the Indians."

Administration critics continue to press for negotiations based on the Contadora process but ignore the Sandinistas own efforts to circumvent Contadora. The talks with the United States at Manzanillo broke down precisely because the Sandinistas were trying to cut a deal which would allow them to get around those provisions discussed in the context of Contadora which require internal dialog and internal reconciliation.

Under the Gephardt amendment, there are no incentives to force the Sandinistas to negotiate. The amendment in effect does nothing. Doing nothing in Nicaragua does not advance the cause of peace and does not prevent a military solution in the region. It leaves the initiative to the Soviet Union and Cuba to determine what will happen in Central America.

Doing nothing in Nicaragua ignores those fighting to gain freedom and democracy for their country. Many of the very people who supported the Sandinistas when they took over have left the Sandinista party and joined the opposition: Leaders from political parties, labor unions, the business community, the press, the church, and even human rights organizations.

The Gephardt amendment is not formulating policy, it is abdicating responsibility. We must not condemn to totalitarianism those seeking freedom.

I urge my colleagues to defeat the Gephardt amendment.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ].

Mr. SOLARZ. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Gephardt amendment. The Contadora process, like motherhood and apple pie, has entered the lexicon of American verities. Everyone says they are for it, but in truth, everyone does not really like it.

There is, I think very clearly, a good deal of skepticism about the viability of the Contadora process in spite of the lipservice which virtually everyone pays to it. So I think it is worthwhile, therefore, to briefly recount the progress that has already been made within the framework of the Contadora process in order to establish the fact that this is indeed a viable diplomatic undertaking.

So far the countries in Central America have already agreed within the framework of the Contadora process to a prohibition on the establishment of foreign military bases.

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They have already agreed on a prohibition with respect to the presence of foreign military advisers. They have already agreed within the framework of the Contadora process to refrain