


The Central American War: A Guide to the U.S. Military Buildup



NARMIC/national action/research on the military industrial complex

PREFACE

The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) is an agency seeking to make a Quaker witness in troubled times. We work for the recognition of human rights, the achievement of social justice, and the assurance of equal opportunity for all because we believe these values are the basis—and the only basis—on which a peaceful world can be built. Their achievement will require major social changes, which we promote through the same method that William Penn identified three centuries ago when he founded his colony of Pennsylvania: to see what love can do.

The same religious conviction which moved the AFSC Board of Directors to

warn against spiralling U.S. involvement in Indochina in 1954 now leads us to witness against our government's search for a military solution to the problems of Central America.

Our grave concern for the worsening situation in Central America is born of direct experience: The AFSC has had staff in the region since the early '60s. We have participated in fact-finding missions and spoken with high government and military officials as well as leaders of the popular organizations. We have supported local self-help projects, provided direct grants for emergency relief and worked with refugees and other victims of repression and violence.

The facts and perspectives provided

in this guide are aimed at exposing the futility of trying to solve with weapons problems that are deeply rooted in political, economic and social oppression, and encouraging policies that speak to the real sources of the conflict.

We therefore commend this guide to the reader's thoughtful attention. We hope it will contribute to a re-evaluation of our disastrous course in Central America and lead U.S. citizens to press for justice and a reconciling spirit in our country's foreign policy.

Stephen G. Cary
Chairperson, Board of Directors,
American Friends Service Committee


The Central American War

At a press conference organized by the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission in early September of 1982 three women refugees described the massacre in August of 300 others, mostly women and children, by Salvadoran troops and planes. "The people tried to leave through the valleys and they cornered them. They killed a mountain of people—children, old people and women," one woman said. "Many people threw themselves off cliffs...At night they bombed with lights so they could see the people, and where they saw them they shot them."

The Salvadoran military is armed with U.S. automatic rifles, grenades and mortars; the troops and their equipment are transported by U.S.-made helicopters, trucks and jeeps. U.S.-trained battalions led the August operation, backed by U.S.-supplied attack aircraft. Since the arrival of the U.S.-made A-37 "Dragonfly" bombers in June 1982, the danger of civilian casualties has intensified. In February 1983, following an attack by the Salvadoran armed forces on the city of Berlin, Acting Archbishop of San Salvador Arturo Rivera y Damas charged the government with "indiscriminate bombing."

The September report of the Salvadoran women and the February bombing of Berlin recall the Vietnam-era tactic of turning whole areas into free fire zones, killing anyone unlucky enough to be caught there, and leveling towns and villages, generating widespread dislocation. It illustrates the growing U.S. involvement with the military forces of the region, including:

- **Strengthening the military forces** of several nations. U.S. military advisors are in El Salvador and Honduras; arms sales and military training are being stepped up. The Administration has resumed military assistance to Guatemala and is proposing to resume military training.
- **Financing governments** of political or strategic interest to the United States which are in danger of economic collapse. Nearly a third of President Reagan's FY (fiscal year) 1982 \$350 million Caribbean Basin Initiative was for El Salvador and Honduras, while other nations in need of economic assistance were excluded.
- **Legitimizing military dictatorships** by promoting elections in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala which did not in fact reduce the effective power of their respective armed forces.
- **Unifying the military regimes** of Central America, sponsoring cooperation among the military forces of El Salvador, Honduras



El Salvador. Governments in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras govern at gunpoint while ignoring the basic needs of their people.

and Guatemala and encouraging military, police and intelligence training by Argentina, Chile and Venezuela. Pentagon planners have declared the need to reaffirm military cooperation among Latin American nations, while secret C.I.A. plans leaked to the press show the groundwork being laid for an armed Pan-American counterrevolutionary force.

- **Increasing U.S. military activity** in the Caribbean, particularly at Key West, in Puerto Rico and Panama, and enhancing the capacity for armed U.S. intervention through large scale military maneuvers and exercises.
- **Militarizing the politics of the region** by discounting proposals for negotiated political settlements, even those of close U.S. allies such as Mexico, France, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama.

Target: Nicaragua

In July, 1979 the Sandinistas, joined by almost the entire Nicaraguan population, ousted one of the most oppressive Central American dictatorships, that of the Somoza family of Nicaragua. In the weeks immediately following tens of thousands of Nicaraguans returned from neighboring countries where they had sought refuge from the massacres of Somoza's National Guard. They found:

- of a population of 2.5 million, 40,000 had been killed; 100,000 wounded; 40,000 children orphaned; 200,000 families left homeless; and 750,000 dependent on food assistance;
- crop cycles disrupted, industrial areas systematically destroyed;
- one of the highest per capital foreign debts in the world; foreign exchange reserves exhausted.

In an effort to salvage the economy and minimize suffering, the Sandinista government embarked on a revolutionary program of social reconstruction and a foreign policy independent of both Moscow and Washington. Rather than encouraging these developments, the Reagan Administration's Central American strategy aims to cripple—or overthrow—Nicaragua's revolutionary government. In mid 1981 the Administration cut off assistance to the Sandinista government, and in December approved a National Security Council plan for a secret war against Nicaragua. The plan featured a proposal to create a Latin commando force and included sabotage of strategic installations and raids inside Nicaragua by counter-revolutionaries based in Honduras. In Fall 1982 the counter-revolutionaries were attacking and kidnapping peasants in an attempt to sabotage the harvest of coffee, Nicaragua's second most important export. In 1982 alone more than 400 Nicaraguans were killed in over 500 attacks inside the country, according to the Sandinista government.

The United States permits training camps for ex-Somoza Guardsmen in Florida and California. The headquarters for the armed counterrevolutionaries is in Miami. The counterrevolutionaries operating out of Honduras are armed with U.S.-made weapons.

The U.S. Congress has begun to grow wary of U.S. activities to overthrow the Sandinista government and late in 1982 passed a resolution intended to limit U.S. covert operations. In February 1983, however, CIA director William J. Casey asked Congress to continue funding U.S. covert activities in 1984, including aid to anti-Sandinista forces.


The C.I.A. plan is similar to other U.S. destabilization efforts, including those used against Cuba and the Allende government in Chile. The pressure of the U.S.-backed military and economic siege is diverting resources from the tasks of reconstruction. In response to the siege the Sandinistas have maintained a state of military alert and curtailed some civil and political rights; as the tension mounts, numbers of Nicaraguans are growing critical of these restrictions.

Deep-Seated Conflicts

The conditions which led to the massive insurrection in Nicaragua are similar to those existing in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. For centuries poverty and suffering have been the fate of the peasant majority. Most of the region's arable land has been controlled by a handful of large landowners. During the 1970s, while the statistics show overall economic growth, the living conditions of the majority worsened as the proportion of landless peasants

increased and the area of subsistence crops declined. Worsening conditions led to the growth of peasant organizations, trade unions, professional and student groups, and organizations rooted in the Catholic church, which tried to mitigate the effects of social dislocation and rising poverty. As the peasantry organized and urban popular movements gathered strength, the large landowners, the military and conservative political forces met them with systematic repression.

The crisis has been worsened by the world recession, which has particularly affected the developing nations. In Central America the rising cost of such crucial imports as fuel and fluctuating prices for their primary exports are contributing to the fragility of the economies of the region. The war in El Salvador, the repression in Guatemala and the threat of a regional war drawing in Nicaragua and Honduras combine with the economic crisis to push national economies toward bankruptcy. The wealthy, uneasy under these circumstances, have taken their money out of the region; without local investment Central America grows increasingly dependent on international aid.



Newsweek exposed details of the CIA plan to undermine the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and revealed the key role the U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, John D. Negroponte, is playing. According to U.S. officials 125-150 CIA personnel are in Honduras.

The U.S. government has been reluctant to acknowledge the indigenous roots of the conflict in Central America. While admitting the need for land reform in El Salvador, for example, the Reagan Administration claims that the insurgency is primarily the result of arms and guidance flowing from Nicaragua, Cuba, and ultimately the Soviet Union. A U.S. "white paper" issued early in 1981 attempting to document this contention was quickly shown by the *Wall Street Journal* to contain fabrications and inaccuracies. Wayne S. Smith, a State Department representative in Havana from 1979 until July, 1982, has noted: "U.S. evidence of arms shipments—especially during the period of Cuban peace overtures—has never been solid. While some arms have been sent from Cuba to El Salvador, the quantities are almost certainly far less than alleged." The Intelligence Committee of the House of Representatives made a similar criticism of the intelligence basis of the Administration's position in a report issued September 22, 1982.

Trends in U.S. Assistance

Recent trends in U.S. assistance are good indicators of U.S. policy in Central America. Following the collapse of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the United States stepped up assistance to El Salvador and Honduras in the hope of quickly reestablishing its influence in the region and putting an end to the mounting insurgency in El Salvador. Simultaneously, the Administration took steps to reopen the way for military aid to Guatemala and suspended all aid to Nicaragua's Sandinista government.

The graphs below represent U.S. government assistance to El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. Direct assistance, however, is not the only source of U.S. aid to the region. International financial institutions,


such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, in which the United States has great influence, lend money for development projects and for paying debts. Through these institutions multi-million-dollar aid packages are being prepared for El Salvador and Guatemala. At the same time, the United States is using its influence to prevent Nicaragua from receiving loans from the World Bank.

U.S. government assistance includes SECURITY ASSISTANCE and ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. The U.S. government defines SECURITY ASSISTANCE as *military assistance and economic support funds*. Military assistance is government-to-government

loans or grants through the Foreign Military Sales finance program, Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training program, for the purchase of weapons, military equipment and training. Economic support funds are monies deposited in the national treasuries of governments of special political or security interest to the United States to assist in the payment of deficits. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE includes *development assistance and PL 480 Food for Peace*. Development assistance is being increasingly diverted from projects designed to satisfy basic human needs and toward the private sector. Food for Peace programs provide food for domestic resale.

El Salvador


The graph shows security assistance—military assistance and economic support funds—spiraling upward between FY 1980 and FY 1982. Congress is still debating Administration requests for FY 1983 and FY 1984. If Congress approves the additional funds requested by the Administration in FY 1983 total U.S. assistance to El Salvador will be greater than \$300 million—U.S. policy would be costing taxpayers close to one million dollars a day. Since actual spending within each fiscal year since 1980 has outstripped the Administration's original request, it is impossible to know what the true cost of U.S. policy in El Salvador will be in FY 1984.



Honduras

The graph shows levels of U.S. assistance to Honduras; security assistance jumped dramatically in FY 1982. The enormous increase in FY 1982 was simultaneous with the first joint Honduran-Salvadoran military actions against the guerillas inside El Salvador, and with a Honduran military buildup on its border with Nicaragua.


Military aid to Honduras in FY 1982 was augmented by U.S. funds for improving airstrips in Honduras. In FY 1982 Honduras received \$13 million of a total \$21 million for upgrading the airstrip at Comayagua. According to Representative Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), "The danger is real of war between Honduras and Nicaragua. They (the United States and Honduras) want places to unload supplies, places to deploy American troops. Let us not have any illusions about what the \$21 million is for. It is for pushing the Honduran military, with our active assistance, into a regional war." The Administration is requesting the rest of the \$21 million, \$8 million more, in FY 1983.



Guatemala

Because of its record of violations of human rights, Guatemala did not receive U.S. military assistance from FY 1979 to FY 1982. The Reagan Administration looked to elections in March 1982 to improve Guatemala's image by establishing a civilian government. However, the elections were fraudulent and precipitated a military coup. The Administration quickly indicated its support of the government established by the military coup and headed by General Rios Montt; steps were taken to reopen the way for U.S. military assistance.

The graph shows that in FY 1983 the Administration is renewing funds for military assistance to Guatemala through its request for \$220,000 for U.S. military training for Guatemalan military personnel. Previously, substantial amounts of military-related equipment had been sold to Guatemala through the U.S. Commerce Department. In early 1983 the Administration approved one of the most controversial of these sales—a \$6 million sale of helicopter spare parts and communications equipment to the Guatemalan air force. The resumption of military assistance is in spite of reports by Amnesty International and other human rights and church-related organizations that human rights abuses in Guatemala continue as they had under previous governments. For FY 1984 the Administration is proposing \$10,250,000 more in military assistance—\$10 million for weapons and military equipment and \$250,000 for military training.



Military Training

Since 1950 nearly 18,000 military personnel from Central America have been trained under U.S. aid programs. The primary purpose of this training is teaching foreign troops how to use U.S. weapons, strategy and tactics. Training is also important in creating support for U.S. foreign policy goals and in establishing ongoing personal contact between the U.S. military and foreign military officers. Training programs for Guatemala and El Salvador were ended in 1977 by President Carter's human rights program.

U.S. training programs include:

- **International Military Education and Training Program**, a form of military grant aid that brings foreign military personnel to any of the more than 100 training institutions in the United States and the Panama Canal Zone;
- **Foreign Military Sales**, forty percent of which are now for training, managerial and technological assistance and other "military technical services;"
- **Military Assistance Advisory Groups**, attached to U.S. embassies all over the world, to advise foreign governments on their military programs;
- **Mobile Training Teams**, U.S. advisers, often Green Berets, who teach specific skills such as intelligence and the use, maintenance and protection of U.S. equipment and weapons.

El Salvador: Nearly 200 Salvadoran military personnel received U.S. training between 1950 and the cut-off in 1977. In FY 1980 the Administration resumed training and has trained at least 2000 more. In March 1983 the Pentagon announced its plan to train a full half of the 22,000-member Salvadoran armed forces. U.S. military training by U.S. military advisors has taken place at bases in the United States, in Panama and in El Salvador. The number of U.S. military personnel in El Salvador is being maintained close to the upper limit, 55, allowed by the Administration's regulations. The activities of the U.S. advisors have been controversial, raising fears of deepening U.S. participation in the war. Press photos of U.S. advisors carrying combat weapons, and a U.S. General Accounting Office report later revealing that all advisors in El Salvador draw combat pay, contributed to the controversy. In February 1983 an advisor was injured and three were subsequently suspended for

violation of rules forbidding their presence in combat areas. Aware of public concern and Congressional wariness about the role of the U.S. advisors, the Administration is proposing that further training of the Salvadoran armed forces be done in the United States, or in a third country—most likely Honduras.

Honduras: In requesting funds for Honduran military assistance for FY 1979 the Pentagon noted that the Honduran military "as a group has historically been friendly to the United States." Since 1980 Mobile Training Teams have instructed the Honduran military in urban counterinsurgency, communications, intelligence, helicopter maintenance and parachuting. Green Berets have been sighted in the militarily sensitive border region between Honduras and El Salvador. On Honduras' volatile border with Nicaragua, U.S. military personnel and U.S. transport planes helped to establish a Honduran base in July 1982. In the same area, in February 1983 the United States and Honduras conducted the largest joint military maneuvers involving those two countries.

Guatemala: The United States trained more than 3300 Guatemalan military personnel between 1950 and 1977. Early in 1982 the Reagan Administration requested funds to train 190 Guatemalans in 1983, declaring that a "Cuban-supported Marxist insurgency" faces Guatemala. The Administration claimed this training would "enable us to increase the Guatemalan military's sensitivity to the control of abuses of the civilian population by the armed forces." Yet U.S. training had not deterred twenty-nine years of repression by the Guatemalan armed forces.



U.S. troops participated in joint maneuvers with the Honduran armed forces in Summer, 1982 near the Nicaraguan border. They helped to build a Honduran base at Mocoron.

El Salvador's Army Goes to School—In the U.S.A.

In December, 1981 the Pentagon brought the newly-formed Ramon Belloso Quick Reaction Battalion to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The home of the Army's Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg specializes in counterinsurgency. An additional 477 Salvadoran officer candidates were sent for training to Fort Benning, Georgia.

The two three-month courses cost the United States \$14 million. Both the officers and the 957-man Belloso Battalion were taught how to use the U.S. weapons being introduced into El Salvador: M-16 rifles, M-

60 machine guns, M-79 grenade launchers, and 90mm recoilless rifles. They were also taught counterinsurgency tactics, and how to take advantage of the mobility offered by the "Huey" helicopters and numerous trucks sent by the U.S. government. Coordination and communication among units were also part of the curriculum, as were such "lessons of Vietnam" as using small patrols, avoiding ambush, night combat, and establishing fire bases. The courses included 39 hours of instruction in "civil-military relations," designed to teach the Salvadorans "a well-defined sense of the need to main-

tain the support of the populace through respect for basic human rights and the promotion of a close working relationship with the people."

Within the first weeks after their return to El Salvador the Belloso Battalion was deployed in a large search-and-destroy operation in northern Chalatenango. In spite of the training they had just received in the United States, they killed 600 unarmed refugees during this operation.

The U.S. Military Presence: A Ring of Terror


U.S. military force rings Central America. U.S. military presence is on the rise and threatens the area with U.S. ground, air and naval forces.

On the Seas: The Naval installation at KEY WEST at the tip of Florida, virtually abandoned since 1974, is being renovated in response to the increased U.S. naval presence in the area. It is being turned into a "forward operating base" capable of receiving U.S. destroyers and warships, as well as gathering and analyzing intelligence data. Its functions were further augmented in December 1981 when the Caribbean Defense Command was relocated from Puerto Rico to Key West. Key West coordinates all U.S. naval activities in the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and those portions of the Pacific Ocean that border Central America, including U.S. war exercises held in the Caribbean. It would direct

In the Air: Claiming that airfields in Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone may be insufficient and that the Navy is too overextended to supply an adequate number of aircraft carriers to the region, the United States has negotiated the improvement of an airstrip in Honduras, at COMAYAGUA, that will be capable of servicing and refueling tactical warplanes such as the Air Force's F-14 and F-15 fighter bombers.

Beginning in February 1983 AWACs, sophisticated U.S. spy planes, have been flying over the Caribbean under the rationale of tracking down the flow of arms to and from Nicaragua.

RAMEY AIR BASE in Puerto Rico, a strategic air command until seven years ago when it was shut down, is being used again by the U.S. Air Force for periodic training missions. The Administration plans to upgrade Ramey and for the Air Force to use it on a more



Navy participation in any regional military intervention.

Other U.S. naval installations in the area include: BERMUDA; ANDROS ISLAND, in the Bahamas; GUANTANAMO, on Cuba's eastern shore; ROOSEVELT ROADS, at Ceiba, Puerto Rico, one of the largest naval facilities in the world; ANTIGUA, in the Antilles; and the CANAL ZONE, in Panama. The regular U.S. naval presence in the Caribbean is now 20 ships.

U.S. destroyers carrying advanced electronic surveillance equipment continuously patrol the GULF OF FONSECA, shared by Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras. Andres Alvarado, former foreign minister of Honduras, has charged the United States with converting AMPALA, on the Isle del Tigre in the Gulf, into a "Guantanamo-type military base."

The United States and Colombia have discussed the use of the Colombian naval facility on the island of SAN ANDRES, off the coast of Nicaragua. Although there is no agreement for U.S. use of this base, U.S. military technicians visited San Andres in April, 1982 to take measurements of its port.

permanent basis.

On the Ground: The U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND (SOUTHCOM) in Panama coordinates U.S. military activities in the Caribbean, Central and South America. Southcom administers the growing U.S. military aid programs in the region and is responsible for U.S. training teams operating in 14 Latin American countries, including Green Berets in El Salvador and Honduras. Southcom manages three training schools for the Latin American armed forces where courses are taught in "U.S. Military Doctrine," "U.S. Government and History," "Low Intensity Warfare," "Internal Defense and Development," "Internal War/Revolution" and "The Problem of Development From a Military Perspective." Instructors at Southcom include Argentines, Chileans and Uruguayans. Southcom also sponsors conferences and workshops on subjects of mutual military interest with Latin and Caribbean countries receiving U.S. military assistance and training. The relocation of Southcom is under consideration; either Honduras or Puerto Rico may be the new location.

U.S. War Games in the Caribbean Dress Rehearsals for U.S. Military Intervention?

- August-October 1981, OPERATION OCEAN VENTURE: An exercise involving 120,000 troops, 240 ships and 1000 aircraft from the NATO nations and Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay and Colombia, including a mock invasion at Vieques, Puerto Rico, called "Amber in the Amberdines," regarded as a thinly veiled reference to Grenada and the Grenadines.
- October 1981, OPERATION FALCON'S EYE: Joint U.S.-Honduran naval maneuvers involving 260 troops, six ships and several planes near Puerto Cortes, Honduras.
- February-March 1982: Thirteen ships from the United States and Canada conducted maneuvers in the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida.
- March 1982, OPERATION SAFE PASS: NATO exercises originally scheduled to take place off Canada were relocated to the Gulf of Mexico. The exercise included 28 ships and 80 aircraft from six NATO nations. Mexico characterized the maneuvers as provocative.
- April 1982, OPERATION READEX: 39 U.S. warships, including two aircraft carriers and some 200 aircraft, conducted maneuvers and practiced an amphibious assault on a "hostile island" at Vieques, Puerto Rico.
- April-May 1982, OPERATION OCEAN VENTURE: A multi-service training maneuver in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico involving 45,000 servicemen, 350 airplanes and 60 ships, including two carrier battle groups. It simulated the invasion of a "hostile" country at Vieques, Puerto Rico, and included an evacuation drill for families at Guantanamo. Rear Admiral Mackenzie, commanding the maneuvers, said they were designed to "send a signal to those people who are friends and those who would oppose us in this part of the world..."
- July-November 1982, OPERATION UNITAS: Caribbean exercises involving the United States, Chile and Colombia. These maneuvers, conducted annually since 1959, were boycotted this year by other Latin nations because of the Falklands/Malvinas war. Six U.S. Navy ships and 20,000 men were involved in this exercise.
- August 1982: Joint U.S.-Honduras military exercises involving Army and Air Force units from Panama. The United States supplied C-130 transport planes and "Huey" and Chinook helicopters, and assisted the Hondurans in establishing a base at Mocoron 25 miles from the Nicaraguan border.
- February 1, 1983, BIG PINE: Joint U.S.-Honduran military exercises costing \$5.2 million in the Honduran border region with Nicaragua near Fort Mocoron involving 1600 U.S. and 4000 Honduran military personnel, and 211 members of the Puerto Rican National Guard (PRNG), the first in which the PRNG participated. The exercises simulated an invasion of Honduras by a hypothetical country, "Corinto," which happens to be the name of a Nicaraguan port on the Atlantic.
- February 11-17, 1983, KINDLE LIBERTY: Joint U.S.-Panama National Guard ground and naval maneuvers held in Panama Canal area. Virtually all of the U.S. Southcom's Panama based forces participated as well as 3000 other U.S. military personnel coming from their home bases in the United States.
- March 10-April 2, 1983: Month-long naval exercises conducted off the coast of Puerto Rico involving 70 ships of the Second Fleet, 8 British and one Dutch ship and 400 aircraft. The Second Fleet's basic aircraft, the F-14 "Tomcat" fighter, has a range of 1000 miles.

"All We Got There Was Death"

EL SALVADOR

The government offensive in Summer 1982 against the guerillas in the provinces of Chalatenango and Morazan, situated along the Honduran border, was a grim forecast of the changes in the war in El Salvador. 5000 Salvadoran troops, including two 1000-man U.S. trained battalions, were deployed. Fighting alongside the Salvadoran armed forces were 3000 Hondurans. The combined armies were bogged down by guerilla forces until U.S.-supplied A-37 Dragonfly aircraft bombed the area. Hundreds of unarmed civilians were killed in the fighting and by the bombing.

This offensive marked the first open collaboration between Honduran and Salvadoran troops inside El Salvador; increased ground and air support for Salvadoran troops from U.S.-supplied trucks and helicopters; the first combat experience of Salvadoran troops recently trained in the United States; and an extended test of U.S.-advocated military strategy, using small commando squads in conjunction with conventional 40-man platoons.

When we were trying to get out of there... we had to go right past the Army. They shot at us with mortars and they threw grenades at us from all directions... We were trying to escape with our children... When we had gotten out, a helicopter went over us. Then when we were trying to get down the hill, they had us surrounded and blocked; they had us ambushed... We were there for quite a while, and all we got was death, death which got us.

—Refugee account of the Chalatenango offensive

The capabilities of the Salvadoran Air Force were greatly increased with the delivery of U.S.-made A37 bombers, helicopters and other aircraft in June 1982. Military officials now report that the Air Force flies more than 30 sorties a day and that of those half a dozen are made by the A37s, subsonic jets that can carry 500 lb. bombs or 2.75 inch rockets in four pods fixed under the wings. A government attack accompanied by heavy bombing of the city of Berlin left a dozen buildings in its central square flattened. Salvadorans from all parts of El Salvador speak of their fears of bombings.

Since October 1979 the human rights office of the Archdiocese of San Salvador contends that 38,000 Salvadorans have been killed or have disappeared. Most were civilian victims of government forces and right-wing death squads. United Nations figures show that in addition more than 800,000 people, about 20% of the population, have been displaced from their homes.



Drawing by a Salvadoran refugee child. In March 1981 the child who drew this picture and many others fled from a government attack in Cabañas province in northern El Salvador, across the Lempa River into Honduras. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are as many as 26,000 Salvadorans in Honduras.

THE HONDURAN CONNECTION: The location of Honduras is highly strategic, bordering El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. The war in El Salvador and government repression in Guatemala have driven tens of thousands of refugees into Honduras. In addition, thousands of ex-members of Somoza's National Guard are based in a dozen camps along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border.

On Honduras' border with El Salvador there has been growing collaboration between the Salvadoran and Honduran armed forces. Honduran ground troops have joined the Salvadoran armed forces during military confrontations in the border region and the Honduran air force has flown fighter jets in support missions for the Salvadoran armed forces. Ex-Somoza Guardsmen based in Honduras near the Nicaraguan border launch armed attacks into Nicaragua almost daily. Hundreds of Nicaraguans have been killed and attempts to rebuild the society disrupted. Nicaragua's Miskito Indians, who live along the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, have been drawn into the conflict. Separated from the rest of Nicaragua by geography, language and culture, the Miskitos resisted the often insensitive attempts of the Sandinista government to include them in their reconstruction efforts. Following cross-border raids into Nicaragua and the discovery of "Operation Red Christmas"—an attempt to seize several Nicaraguan towns scheduled for late 1981—Miskito villages were forcibly relocated. In response many Miskitos fled to Honduras where some have joined the Somoza supporters.

As a result of the continuous conflict on this border, Honduran troops have come into direct confrontation with Sandinista soldiers. A new Honduran military base has been established with U.S. assistance and Honduras is building an airstrip near the Miskito refugee camps in Honduras. The United States is installing a \$5 million radar system near Choluteca in the border region capable of tracking planes within 250 miles—a range covering most of Nicaraguan and Salvadoran air space. The radar system is the first of its kind to be installed in Honduras; 50 U.S. Air Force personnel will operate the system under Honduran security beginning in Spring 1983.



Militarization of the border region between El Salvador and Honduras endangers both those seeking escape from the fighting in El Salvador and Hondurans living in the area. In order to militarize the area refugees who had settled near the border in Honduras were forcibly relocated to the Honduran interior. Many local Hondurans have fled from the area in fear.

The increasing U.S. presence in Honduras points to the importance of that country for U.S. regional strategy and the dangerous situation into which U.S. policies are leading Honduras. Approximately 100 U.S. military advisors are in Honduras as well as over 100 CIA operatives. The U.S. diplomatic mission numbers 147, the largest in Central America. It is headed by John Negroponte, who was a Vietnam-era diplomat in Saigon between 1964 and 1968, the years of the U.S. military buildup; Negroponte is reported to be directing the secret CIA-sponsored war against Nicaragua. Since Fall 1981 there have been three major joint U.S.-Honduran military maneuvers including the largest military exercise ever to take place in the region.

With its armed forces mobilized on two borders, Honduras has abruptly stopped progress toward democratization. Despite elections in November, 1981—the first in 18 years—conservative elements have consolidated within the armed forces and tightened their grip on the country, cracking down on Honduran peasant, union and student leaders as well as members of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan exile communities. Even a top-ranking member of the Honduran armed forces has protested the repression; in late August, 1982, Colonel Torres Arias, head of military intelligence from 1976 until January 1982, condemned the disappearances and political murders occurring. It is a tragic irony that just as the Honduran people thought they had won social and political liberalization at the polls they find themselves threatened by regional war and suffering increasing domestic repression.

GUATEMALA: In 1954 a C.I.A. covert operation overthrew a democratically elected reform government and ushered in the present era of repressive military rule in Guatemala. In the ensuing 29 years the Guatemalan armed forces have conducted a systematic campaign of murder and terror against all opposition, but have failed to stamp it out.

Following the March 1982 coup of General Rios Montt there was a reduction of violence in Guatemala's cities simultaneous with the unleashing of a ruthless campaign of terror and mass killing in the highland region. Indians make up 60% of the total Guatemalan population and the highlands are the home of the majority. As a result of the campaign of terror thousands of Indians have fled their villages, fleeing to Mexico or retreating further into the highlands. Separated from their farms those seeking safety in the remote highlands frequently face starvation. On their return the Army forces many into government controlled areas and demands their participation in the army's civil patrols. As one Guatemalan military commander described the government's "beans and bullets" program: "If you're with us we'll feed you, if not we'll kill you."

First they came in helicopters and gathered the people together. Then, one by one they took them away and killed them... and after they killed the people they chopped them up and picked at them with machetes... My home was burned to ashes. We were in town then... if we had still been home when the army came, we'd be ashes by now.

—Refugee account

Church sources state that the military campaign against Guatemala's indigenous population has killed thousands, displaced more than a million people, and driven more than 100,000 into Mexico and other Central American countries to seek refuge.

The United States government regards the Rios Montt-directed campaign against the population in the rural highlands as a successful counterinsurgency effort. In Fall 1982 it announced that the human rights situation in Guatemala had improved, claiming a reduction in the absolute number of summary executions of civilians by the Guatemalan forces. Despite the controversy this assertion aroused, and contrary evidence produced by Amnesty International and other human rights groups, the Administration rushed \$6 million in military assistance to Guatemala.



The massacres of the Indians and the dislocation of Indian villages are threatening the survival of indigenous cultures in Guatemala.

A Catalogue of U.S. Military Equipment in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala*

El Salvador: U.S. assistance virtually feeds, clothes, equips and trains the Salvadoran armed forces. U.S. weapons and equipment are greatly increasing the fire power, troop mobility and communications among combat units. For example, in late 1980 a \$250,000 contract was signed for a U.S. Technical Field Team "to implement an effective and supportable logistical, signal and motor maintenance/support." Early in 1982 U.S. assistance was proposed to establish an intelligence school and system, improve ground force capabilities, improve command and control through installation of a nationwide radio and teletype, provide aircraft, spare parts, and funds to cover logistics advice and administrative costs.




U.S. aircraft arriving in El Salvador in mid-1982 signaled a change in the war in El Salvador. The aircraft greatly increased bombing capability, air-to-

ground coordination and the armed forces' ability to move large numbers of troops and equipment around the country rapidly.

U.S. military assistance is also to enhance the small Salvadoran navy and includes ship spare parts and upgrading vessels.

According to the Pentagon, nearly 90 percent of the Salvadoran junta's FY 1983 request is for "expendable" or "sustaining" items...ammunition, boots and other personal equipment, vehicular transportation and communications gear. In its proposals for additional military assistance in FY 1983 and for FY 1984 the Administration is emphasizing the need to provide more military training to the Salvadoran armed forces.

Western European countries, particularly France, and Israel have also exported weapons to El Salvador.

Quantity (where known)	Item/Manufacturer (where known)	Description/Date of delivery (where known)
20	UH-1H Iroquois helicopter Bell Helicopter, the largest division of Textron, Inc., Fort Worth, TX	"Huey," widely used in Vietnam: scout vehicle, transports up to 15 troops or 5000 lbs. of external ordnance (rockets, machine guns, grenade launchers). Its slim fuselage makes it hard to hit. Hopes to increase to 24 / 1981-1982.
1	FH-1100 commercial observation helicopter / Fairchild-Hiller, Farmingdale, Long Island, NY	Adaptable for military use: 5 passengers or 1000 lbs., 348 mile range. 
6	A-37B Dragonfly jet attack aircraft Cessna, Wichita, KS	Used against ground targets: highly accurate, maneuverable, can take off and land in a short space, ideal for rough terrain; carries nearly 5000 lbs. of externally mounted bombs and air munitions; heavily used in Vietnam to carry bombs, rockets, white phosphorous and cluster bombs; fixed armament a minigun which can fire up to 6000 rounds per minute / 1982.
4	O-2 Skymaster spotter aircraft Cessna, Wichita, KS	For visual reconnaissance, target identification, target marking, ground-to-air coordination and damage assessment; used in Vietnam, often as an attack bomber; can carry rockets and flares; easy to maintain and fly; can stay aloft a long time / 1982.
2	C-123 Provider jet transport Fairchild-Hiller Corp., Farmingdale, Long Island, NY	58 troops or 54,000 lbs. of cargo; in Vietnam a few modified as gunships, others fitted with defoliation equipment / 1982.
1	C-47 Skytrain transport Douglas Aircraft Co., a division of McDonnell Douglas Corp., Long Beach, CA	Carries 74 troops; modified versions used in Vietnam; five destroyed / January 1982.
6	T-41 Mescalero trainer aircraft Cessna, Wichita, KS	900 lbs. of ordnance underwing. 
3	T-34A Mentor trainer aircraft Beech Aircraft Corp., Wichita, KS	Can be used as an attack bomber.
6-10	T-6 Texans trainer aircraft North American (now part of Rockwell International) El Segundo, CA	1500 lbs. of rockets and gun pods.
10	M-113A1 armored personnel carrier Food Machinery Corp. (FMC), San Jose, CA	Carries 13 combat troops; Browning M-2 .50 cal. machinegun with 2000 rounds of ammunition. (1000 lost in combat in South-east Asia.)
75	Miscellaneous Vehicles	Ford 22' diesel trucks with seats; cargo trucks; tank trailers / 1980.
4	M-23 Armament Systems	Includes two M-60D 7.6 mm machine guns, one for each helicopter door; 600 rounds per gun at rate of fire of 550-600 rpm.
30	M-101A1 105mm howitzer / Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, IL	World War II era weapon; weighs 2.5 tons; towed by light truck or jeep, or lifted by helicopter; fires up to 100 rounds per hour; maximum range 7.8 miles.
36	M-67 90 mm recoilless rifle	Fires a high explosive round up to 560 yards / 1981.
30	M-18A1 57 mm recoilless rifle	Fires a high explosive round more than a mile, a white phosphorous shell up to 3 miles.
30	M-1 81 mm mortar	World War II era weapon mounted on halftrack weapons carrier; fires 30 rpm, sending a high explosive or white phosphorous shells more than a mile / 1981.
20	M-19 60 mm mortar	Fires high explosive and white phosphorous shells more than a mile / 1981.
208	M-79 40 mm grenade launcher	Fires a grenade accurately up to 180 yards / 1981.
4000	M-16 A1 rifle	Lightweight; the weapon of Vietnam; unlike standard rifles, which spin the bullet, the M-16A1 "tumbles" the bullet, giving it a shorter range but causing it to make a gaping wound / 1981.
222	MK82 500 lb. bomb	Makes a crater approximately 10 feet deep, 30 feet across / 1981.
	Small Firearms / Smith and Wesson, Springfield, MA; Colt, Hartford, CT; and others.	Pistols, shotguns, rifles. 
52,010	M-67 fragmentation hand grenade	Sends lethal fragments to a radius of 20 yards / 1981.
10,000	Riot Control Equipment	40 mm CS gas grenade, nausea-causing anti-riot agent. Tear gas grenade launcher; protective masks / since 1980.
	Ammunition	Artillery, rifle and pistol; smoke grenades; fuses.
	Image intensifier	Used at night to improve contrast of objects against background; widely used in Vietnam / 1980.
	Night vision device	PVS-2B electro-optic devices for observation and nighttime weapons targeting; used in Vietnam / 1980.
	Communications Equipment	250 AN/PRC manpack radio set with five mile range / 1980. AN/VRC and AN/ARC radio set / 1980. RC-292 antenna system / 1980. 30 KW generator / 1981. Thousands of batteries / since 1980.
	Medical Equipment	27 ambulances / 1980. 10,000 first aid dressings / 1980. Medical and dental supplies / 1980.
	Personal Items	Boots, mess kits, compasses, C-rations, helmets, flak jackets.

*These lists are necessarily an understatement of the actual U.S. weapons in the arsenals of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala as it is impossible to compile accurately a total figure for small items sold by the U.S. and because all major items appearing are either verified by *The Military Balance 1982-83* or appear in at least two other sources.

Honduras: Honduras has the largest, most sophisticated air force in Central America. Although the majority of aircraft listed below were exported to Honduras prior to the current military buildup, in FY 1980 the United States lent Honduras ten "Huey" helicopters; Honduras has acquired an additional six since then. The United States has contracted for the repair of Honduran aircraft and for aircraft engines. Aircraft equipment is overhauled and re-calibrated at HOWARD AIR FORCE BASE, in the Canal Zone in Panama.


The United States provides spare parts, ammunition and repair equipment for Honduras' basic weapons systems. In 1981 a Honduran team came to the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management, WRIGHT PATTERSON AIR BASE, Dayton, Ohio to learn to handle the influx of U.S. military assistance. According to the Pentagon 75% of the FY 1983

Honduran request for military assistance is for expendable items that keep the military going. The Administration is proposing \$41 million in military assistance for FY 1984, double its FY 1983 request. It includes transport aircraft, a nationwide communications system, training and helicopters.

The United States helped create the Honduran navy in 1975-77; it currently includes 5-7 Swift patrol craft made by SWIFTSHIPS, INC., Morgan City, Louisiana.

Israel is also a significant supplier of weapons, aircraft and military equipment to Honduras. A visit to Honduras in Fall 1982 by then Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and his subsequent statement to the press that Israel would cooperate with Honduras in military and security matters prompted speculation that Israel and Honduras would soon announce a major arms deal.

Quantity (where known)	Item/Manufacturer (where known)	Description/Date of delivery (where known)
14-20	UH-1H helicopter	See El Salvador / since 1980.
2-3	UH-19D Chickasaw helicopter Sikorsky Aircraft, division of United Technologies, Stratford, CT	Multi-purpose transport and utility.
6-8	A-37B attack aircraft	See El Salvador / 1975.
3	RT 33-A reconnaissance aircraft Lockheed, Burbank, CA	
2	C-54 Skymaster transport aircraft Douglas Aircraft, division of McDonnell Douglas, Long Beach, CA	Carries 50 troops.
1-5	C-47 Skytrain transport aircraft Douglas Aircraft.	Most widely used military transport in history; carries 74 combat troops; modified version used in Vietnam.
2	C-45 transport aircraft Beech Aircraft Corporation (subsidiary of Raytheon Company), Wichita, KS	
2	CE-180 Skywagon commercial aircraft / Cessna, Wichita, KS	Used abroad for military transport and reconnaissance / 1959.
2-3	CE-185 Skywagon utility aircraft Cessna, Wichita, KS	Many have been modified for military use / 1961.
6	T-6 Texan	See El Salvador
24	T-28D Trojan trainer aircraft North American, now Rockwell International, El Segundo, CA	Carries 4000 lbs. of ordnance underwing; early versions used in Vietnam and the Congo.
5	T-41 Mescalero trainer aircraft	See El Salvador / 1973-75.
	Armored Personnel Carriers and Fighting Vehicles	
	15 M-3A1 White	World War II era vehicle; fourwheeled armored car weighing 6.5 tons; speed 55 mph; carries .50 cal. and .30 cal. machine guns / 1951.
	15 M-6 Staghound	World War II era / 1951.
	10 M-24 Chaffee	World War II era / 1954-55.
	Trucks and other vehicles	Enhance mobility of troops and equipment.
12	M-116 75 mm howitzer	
8-12	M-101 105 mm howitzer	See El Salvador.
12	M-102 105 mm howitzer	Light weight; towed by truck or jeep; can fire 3 rpm up to 9 miles.
	M-67 90 mm recoilless rifle	See El Salvador.
	M40A2 106 mm recoilless rifle	Often mounted on a jeep, fires high explosive round up to 5 miles.
	M-18A1 57 mm recoilless rifle	
	81 mm mortar	
	120 mm mortar	
106	M16 A1 rifles, spare parts and accessories.	See El Salvador / 1980.
433	M14 rifles, spare parts and accessories.	1980.
102	machine guns	1979.
5000	carbines	1979.
	Small arms	Grenades, submachine guns, 164 bayonets, revolvers, pistols, mines.
	Personal equipment	Boots, canteens, uniforms; C-rations, 20,000 helmets.
	Medical equipment	U.S. technical team to survey for 150-bed hospital.
40	Night vision sight, MK 505	See El Salvador.
11	Laser range finder	1981.
	AN/PRC-77 field radio Sentinel Electronics Bristol, PA	Increase coordination capabilities among units.
	Riot control equipment	Unidentified riot control agent; safety masks accompanied by Army Field Manuals on chemical and biological agents; riot control gun.



Guatemala: In 1977 Guatemala refused to comply with U.S. human rights criteria and rejected U.S. military assistance. Though military assistance was technically cut off deliveries of U.S. weapons and military equipment already in the pipeline continued, as well as some FMS Cash Sales and Commercial Sales. Since mid-1981 the Guatemalan government has also purchased significant quantities of items which, though officially designated as "non-military," are used by the armed forces for military purposes. Examples of such items are: shotguns, crime investigation equipment, handcuffs, a surveillance camera, a psychological stress analyzer, truck and truck parts. Through commercial sales Guatemala also acquired Bell helicopters, civilian variants of Bell's military model; eyewitness accounts reveal Guatemalan air force raids using these Bell aircraft. It was also in this way that Bell Helicopter Company brought at least twenty Guatemalan air force officers to its Fort Worth, Texas facility for training during 1982. At the time of their training the Guatemalans candidly

discussed with their U.S. instructors plans for arming their Bell helicopters with machine guns.

On January 7, 1983 the Reagan Administration announced its decision to resume official military ties with the Guatemalan government of General Rios Montt; it authorized \$6 million in helicopter spare parts and communications gear to the Guatemalan air force. In FY 1984 the Administration is proposing \$10.2 million in military assistance to include engineering, medical and communications equipment, training and spare parts for planes and helicopters.

Over two-thirds of Guatemala's 15 naval vessels were built by the U.S. companies HALTER MARINE SERVICES, INC., New Orleans, LA and SEWART SEACRAFT, Berwick, LA and commissioned between 1972-1977.

Over the past decade Western European countries, as well as Israel, Brazil, Taiwan and Yugoslavia, have exported arms and military-related equipment to Guatemala.

Quantity (where known)	Item/Manufacturer (where known)	Description/Date of delivery (where known)
4	Bell UH-1H helicopter	
3	Bell 212 helicopter	
6	Bell 412 helicopter	
8	Bell 206 B helicopter	
6	Bell 206L-1 helicopter Bell Helicopter, Textron, Inc. Fort Worth TX	purchased through the U.S. Department of Commerce 1980-82; civilian helicopters identified as fitted with machine guns by the Guatemalan armed forces
10-11	A-37B Dragonfly attack aircraft	See El Salvador / 1971-75.
9-10	C-47 Skytrain transport aircraft	See El Salvador / 1976.
1	DC-6B commercial aircraft / Douglas Aircraft, McDonnell Douglas, Long Beach, CA	Version of C-54 Skymaster (See Honduras).
2-3	CE-180 Skywagon utility aircraft	See Honduras / 1961.
6-12	CE-172 Skyhawk trainer aircraft Cessna, Wichita, KS	Carries 900 lbs. of ordnance.
2-4	U-206C Stationair commercial plane / Cessna, Wichita, KS	Seats 4 to 10; modified for military use.
12	T-41 Mescalero trainer aircraft	See El Salvador.
7-25	M-3A1 Stuart light tank	World War II era with 37 mm gun / 1950.
10	M-113A1 armored personnel carrier	See El Salvador / 1972-73.
15	M-8 Greyhound armored car	World War II era; speed 55 mph; with 37 mm gun; .30 cal. machine gun with 1500 rounds; and .50 cal. anti-aircraft gun with 1000 rounds.
7	V-150 Commando armored car Cadillac Gage, subsidiary Ex-Cell-O, Warren, MI	Carries 12 combat troops and generally 2 machine guns.
6	M-3 armored personnel carrier	World II era; normally carries 2 machine guns and 10 troops.
50	trucks	Purchased through the Commerce Department / 1981.
100	jeeps	Purchased through the Commerce Department / 1981.
12-36	M-101A1 105 mm howitzer	See El Salvador.
	M-1 mm mortar	See El Salvador.
12	4.2" mortar M-329A2 4.2" mortar Chamberlin Manufacturing Corp., Elmhurst, IL	Fires high explosive projectile up to 3 miles.
12	M-2 60 mm mortar	See Honduras.
	M-20A1 3.5" rocket launcher	Korean War era; one man weapon—updated version of World War II era bazooka; maximum range 140 yards.
10,000	M-16A1 5.56 mm rifle	See El Salvador / 1977.
	Browning .30 caliber machine gun	World War II era.
	M-3A1 .45 caliber submachine gun	World War II era; fires 450 rpm with a range of 250 yards.
	Firearms	M-1 Garand .30 caliber rifle; M-1A1 .30 caliber carbine; rockets; shotgun and shotgun parts; pistols, revolvers.
	Ammunition Day and Zimmerman, Philadelphia, PA; Hercules, Inc., Wilmington, DE; ICI Americas, Inc., Wilmington, DE; Olin Corp., Winchester Group, East Alton, IL; Remington Arms Co., Bridgeport, CT.	1,060,000 cartridges up through 20 mm./ 1978, ammunition raw materials/1978, 1979; .45 cal. cartridges; 1,028,000 cartridges up through 20 mm./1980.
	Riot control agent/herbicide	1978.
22	TF-76 Taser and taser spares	Anti-personnel weapon now outlawed in Canada; looks like a flashlight, fires two short-range darts connected to wires into victim, then fires high voltage low current charge of electricity, causing instant incapacitation.
	Communications equipment	Radios; P-11 speech scramblers.
	Personnel equipment	Armored vests, other protective equipment.



The President, Congress and the media must hear the resolve of U.S. citizens for an end to U.S. support for repression and military terror and for help for the development of democratic alternatives and a peaceful process for solving the many complex problems of Central America. You can join a growing movement seeking:

- an end to U.S. military support
- withdrawal of U.S. military advisors
- an end to covert activities
- a negotiated political settlement involving all parties to the conflict in El Salvador; a negotiated end to hostilities with Nicaragua, and between Nicaragua and Honduras
- an end to support for the repressive Guatemalan government
- support for organizations providing humanitarian assistance to victims of violence

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Human Rights/Global Justice Program, 1501 Cherry Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102, (215—241-7165)

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Available from AFSC Latin America Program, 1501 Cherry Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215—241-7146): **Central America: The Roots of the Crisis**, a 30-minute slideshow (1982, \$50); **Guatemala: A People Beseiged** (1978, \$50); speakers; and information about the AFSC Central America Assistance Fund.

The following organizations can help you learn more about Central America, help you organize activities in your community, place of worship, school or union, and put you in touch with others in your area with similar concerns.

Americas Watch, 705 G Street SE, Washington, DC 20003; **Amnesty International**, 705 G Street SE, Washington, DC 20003; **CISPES** (Coalition in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador) 930 F Street NW, Washington, DC 20004; **Center for International Policy**, 120 Maryland Avenue NE, Washington, DC 20002; **Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy**, 120 Maryland Avenue NE, Washington, DC 20002; **CAMINO**, 1151 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138; **Denver Justice and Peace**, 2840 Lawrence Street, Denver, CO 80205; **EPICA** (Ecumenical Program for International Communication and Action) 1470 Irving Street NW, Washington, DC 20010; **ICCHRLA** (Interchurch Committee on Human Rights in Latin America) 40 St. Clair Avenue E, Toronto, Ontario M4T 1M9; **Institute for Policy Studies**, 1901 Q Street NW, Washington, DC 20009; **Interreligious Task Force on El Salvador**, 475 Riverside Drive, M. 1020, New York, NY 10115; **LAWG** (Latin America Working Group) Box 2207, Station P, Toronto, Ontario M5S 2T2; **NACLA** (North American Congress on Latin America) 151 West 19th Street, New York, NY 10011; **NISGUA** (National Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala) 930 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20004; **OXFAM-America**, 115 Broadway, Boston, MA 02116; **Nicaragua Solidarity Network**, 930 F Street NW, Washington, DC 20004; **Religious Task Force**, 407 S. Dearborn Street, Chicago, IL 60605; **Unitarian Universalist Service Committee**, 78 Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02108; **WOLA** (Washington Office on Latin America) 110 Maryland Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 20002.

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NARMIC Staff: Thomas Conrad, Eva Gold (project coordinator), David Goodman, Mary Morrell, and Methodist mission intern Marilyn Wood.

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