DOCUMENT: WHITEPAP.TXT This file submitted by: Conrad Richter Co-Editor, CTN News Tibetan Response to China's White on Tibet ------------------------------------------ Content: 1. Status of Tibet 2. Invasion and illegal annexation of Tibet 3. National Uprising 4. Traditional Tibetan society 5. Human Rights 6. Socio-economic conditions and colonialism 7. Religion and national identity 8. Population transfer and control 9. State of Tibet's environment 10. Militarisation and regional peace 11. Quest for solution Preface As the international community takes an increasingly keen interest in the question of Tibet, the demand for information grows. The world is no longer obsessed with the political ideological conflict between the two superpowers of the Cold War period, so that Governments and non-governmental actors can, once again, turn to other burning problems, such as the situation in Tibet. Many Governments are in the process of reviewing their foreign policy on many fronts. They should also thoroughly review their Tibet policy in line with the post-cold war international reality. Initiatives by parliaments and conferences in different parts of the world to address the human rights situation in Tibet and its underlying political cause as well as moves by a growing number of countries to take up the issue again at the United Nations have met with strong resistance from the Government of the People's Republic of China. One of the results have been a stream of propaganda booklets, following the Stalinist and Maoist tradition, intended to convince foreign readers of China's right to rule Tibet and the great benefit it brought to the people of Tibet. The Present document, Tibet: Proving Truth from Facts, is intended to respond to the new demand for concise information on key points of the Tibetan question, and at the same time, to serve as a response to the Chinese propaganda, particularly as contained in Chinese State Council's White Paper. The Tibetan Government-in-Exile does not have the resources to respond to each misrepresentation of the Tibetan situation which appears in the Chinese propaganda. But truth being on the side of the Tibetan people, we feel the need from time to time to restate the facts plainly, as they really are, and trust that this will serve the cause of truth and justice. This publication touches upon many areas of concern: the fundamental question of the status of Tibet, the validity of China's claim to ownership of it and Tibetan people's right to self-determination; the "17-Point Agreement" and its effect on Tibet's status; the events surrounding the resistance to Chinese rule and the Dalai Lama's flight to India; the Tibetan social system before the Chinese occupation and democratic reforms initiated by the Dalai Lama; human rights conditions in occupied-Tibet; deprivation of religious freedom; socio-economic conditions and colonialism; population transfer and control; the state of Tibet's environment; issues related to the militarisation of Tibet; and the efforts that have been undertaken to find a solution to the question of Tibet. One aspect of the Tibetan situation has been insufficiently highlighted in the past, even though it is fundamental to understanding the context of much of what is happening in Tibet today. This is the profoundly colonialist nature of Chinese rule in Tibet. We tend to identify colonialism with European colonial expansion in the past two centuries. But, as the Malaysian, Irish and other governments pointed out during the United Nations General assembly debates on the Question of Tibet, colonialism in all its manifestations must be brought to an end, whether perpetrated by countries in the West or the East. The Chinese themselves view Tibet in colonial terms: that is, not as part of China proper, but as non-Chinese territory which China has a right to own and exploit, on the basis of relationship that existed 700 years ago, or, at best, 200 years ago. This attitude is evident already from the title of the Chinese Government's White Paper, which refers to the ownership of Tibet. If Tibet were truly an integral part of China for hundreds of years, as China claims, Tibet could not form the object of ownership by the country it is already a part of. The very notion of ownership of Tibet by China is colonialist and imperialist in nature. Colonialism is characterised by a number of important elements, all of which are abundantly present in China's rule over Tibet. The most common characteristics of colonialism are: *domination by an alien power; *acquisition of control through military force, unequal treaty; *frequent insistence that the colony is an integral part of the mother state; *maintenance of control through instruments of military or administrative and economic power in the hands of the colonial power; *active or passive rejection of alien domination by the colonised people; *suppression, by force if necessary, of persons opposing colonial rule; *chauvinism and discrimination; *the imposition of alien cultural, social and ideological values claimed to be civilising; *the imposition of economic development programmes and the exploitation of natural resources of the colony, primarily for the benefit of the colonial power; *promotion of population transfer of citizens of the metropolitan state into the colony and other forms of demographic manipulation; *disregard for the natural environment in the colony; and, in most cases, *an obsessive desire to hold on to the colony despite the political and economic cost. Most of these characteristics are discussed in this document. Some of these issues are also discussed in the Chinese White Paper on Tibet, in a manner and style which only confirms the colonialist or imperialist view of Tibet held by China's leadership. Chapter 1. Status of Tibet Introduction At the time of its invasion by troops of the People's Liberation Army of China in 1949, Tibet was an independent state in fact and law. The military invasion constituted an aggression on a sovereign state and a violation of international law. Today's continued occupation of Tibet by China, with the help of several hundred thousand troops, represents an ongoing violation of international law and of the fundamental rights of the Tibetan people to independence. The Chinese Communist Government claims it has a right to ownership of Tibet. It does not claim this right on the basis of its military conquest in 1949 or alleged effective control over Tibet since then or since 1959. The Chinese Government also does not base its claim to ownership on the so-called Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet which it forced upon Tibet in 1951. Instead, China's alleged legal claim is based on historical relationships primarily of Mongol or Manchu rulers with Tibetan lamas and, to a lesser extent, of Chinese rulers and Tibetan lamas. The main events relied on by the Chinese Government occurred hundreds of years ago: during the height of Mongol imperial expansion, when the Mongol Emperors extended their political supremacy throughout most of Asia and large parts of Eastern Europe; and when Manchu Emperors ruled China and expanded their influence throughout East and Central Asia, including Tibet, particularly in the 18th century. It is not disputed that at different times in its long history Tibet came under various degrees of foreign influence: that of the Mongols, the Gorkhas of Nepal, the Manchu Emperors of China and the British rulers of India. At other times in Tibet's history, it was Tibet which exercised power and influence on its neighbours, including China. It would be hard to find any state in the world today that has not been subjected to foreign domination or influence for some part of its history. In Tibet's case the degree and length of foreign influence and interference was quite limited. Moreover, relationship with the Mongol, Chinese and Manchu rulers, to the extent they had political significance, were personal in nature and did not at any time imply a union or integration of the Tibetan state with or into a Chinese state. However fascinating Tibet's ancient history may be, it's status at the time of the Chinese invasion must, of course, be judged on the basis of its position in modern history, especially its relationship with China since 1911, when the Chinese overthrew the foreign Manchu rule and became the masters of their own country. Every country can go back to some period in history to justify territorial claims on neighbouring states. That is unacceptable in international law and practice. The reader of China's White Paper Tibet: Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation will be struck by the scant attention its authors pay to Tibet's modern history in the decades before 1949. This is because from 1911 to the completion of the Chinese occupation in 1951, there is no evidence of Chinese authority or influence in Tibet which can support China's claim. In fact, the preponderance of the evidence shows precisely the opposite: that Tibet was to all intents and purposes a sovereign state, independent of China. This conclusion is supported by most legal scholars and experts on the subject. The International Commission of Jurists' Legal Enquiry Committee on Tibet reported in its study on Tibet's legal status: Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international law. In 1950, there was a people and a territory, and a government which functioned in that territory, conducting its own domestic affairs free from any outside authority. From 1913-1950, foreign relations of Tibet were conducted exclusively by the Government of Tibet, and countries with whom Tibet had foreign relations are shown by official documents to have treated Tibet in practice as an independent State. [Tibet and Chinese People's Republic, Geneva, 1960, pp. 5,6] Forty years of independence is clearly sufficient for a country to be regarded as such by the international community. Many members of the United Nations today have enjoyed a similar or even shorter period of independence. But in Tibet's case, even its ancient history has been selectively re-written by the Chinese Government's propaganda machine to serve the purpose of defending its claim to ownership. Thus, even if it is not necessary to discuss Tibet's early history in order to understand its status on the eve of China's military invasion, we believe it is useful to review it briefly, just to set the record straight. The status of Tibet: 1911-1951 There can be little argument that on the eve of China's military invasion, which started at the close of 1949, Tibet possessed all the attributes of independent statehood recognised under international law: a defined territory, a population inhabiting that territory, a government, and the ability to enter into international relations. The territory of Tibet largely corresponds to the geological plateau of Tibet, which consists of 2.5 million square kilometre. At different times in history, wars were fought and treaties signed concerning the precise location of boundaries. The population of Tibet at the time of the Chinese invasion was approximately six million. That population constituted the Tibetan people, a distinct people with a long history, rich culture and spiritual tradition. Tibetans are a people distinct from the Chinese and other neighbouring peoples. Not only have the Tibetans never considered themselves to be Chinese, the Chinese have also not regarded the Tibetans to be Chinese (hence, for example, the references to barbarians in Chinese historical annals). The Government of Tibet was headquartered in Lhasa, the capital city of Tibet. It consisted of a Head of State (the Dalai Lama), a Cabinet of Ministers (the Kashag), a National Assembly (the Tsongdu), and an elaborate bureaucracy to administer the vast territory of Tibet. The Judicial system was based on that developed by Songtsen Gampo (7th Century), Jangchub Gyaltsen (14th Century), the Fifth Dalai Lama (17th Century) and the Thirteenth Dalai Lama (20th Century), and was administered by Magistrates appointed by the Government. The Government of Tibet levied tax, issued its own currency, ran the country's postal system and issued postage stamps, commanded Tibet's small army, and generally conducted all affairs of Government. It was an ancient form of government which had served the needs of Tibet well in the past, but was in need of reform in order for the country to keep pace with the great political, social and economic changes that were taking place in the world. The Tibetan form of government was a highly de-centralised one, with many districts and principalities of Tibet enjoying a large degree of self-government. This was, to a large extent, inevitable due to the vastness of the territory and the lack of modern communication systems. The international relations of Tibet were focused on the country's neighbours. Tibet maintained diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with countries in the region such as Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Mongolia, China, British India, and, to a limited extent, with Russia and Japan. Tibet's independent foreign policy is perhaps most obviously demonstrated by the country's neutrality during World War II. Despite strong pressures from Britain, the U.S. and China to allow the passage of military supplies through Tibet to China when Japan blocked the strategically vital Burma Road, Tibet held fast to its declared neutrality, which the Allies were constrained to respect. China today claims that no country ever recognised Tibet. In international law, recognition can be obtained by an explicit act of recognition or by implicit act or behaviour. The conclusion of treaties, even the conduct of negotiations, and certainly the maintenance of diplomatic relations are forms of recognition. Mongolia and Tibet concluded a formal treaty of recognition in 1913; Nepal not only concluded peace treaties with Tibet, and maintained an Ambassador in Lhasa, but also formally stated to the United Nations in 1949, as part of its application for UN membership, that it maintained independent diplomatic relations with Tibet as it did with several other countries including the United Kingdom, the United States, India and Burma. Nepal, Bhutan, Britain, China and India maintained diplomatic missions in Tibet's capital, Lhasa. Although China claimed in its propaganda that its mission in Tibet was a branch office of the so-called Commission of Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs of the Guomindang government, the Tibetan Government only recognised it as a diplomatic mission. Its status was no higher than the Nepalese Embassy (Nepal had a full Ambassador or Vakil in Lhasa) or the British Mission. The Tibetan Foreign Office also conducted limited relations with the United States when President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent emissaries to Lhasa to request assistance for the Allied war effort against Japan during the Second World War. Also, during the four UN General assembly debates on Tibet in 1959, 1960, 1961 and 1965, many countries expressly referred to Tibet as an independent country illegally occupied by China. Relations with Nationalist China China's position was ambiguous during this period (1911-49). On the one hand, the Nationalist Government unilaterally announced in its constitution and in communications to other countries that Tibet was a province of the Republic of China (one of the five races of the Republic). On the other hand, it recognised that Tibet was not part of the Republic of China in its official communications with the Government of Tibet. Thus, China's President repeatedly sent letters and envoys to the Dalai Lama and to the Tibetan Government asking that Tibet join the Republic of China. Similar messages were sent by China to the Government of Nepal. Both Tibet and Nepal consistently refused to join China. In response to the first letter of Chinese President Yuan Shih-kai, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama rejected the invitation to join the Republic, explaining courteously but firmly that Tibetans did not approve of the Chinese Government due to past injustices and stated: The Republic has only just been proclaimed and the national foundations are far from strong. It behoves the President to exert his energies towards the maintenance of order. As for Thibet, the Thibetans are quite capable of preserving their existence intact and there is no occasion for the President to worry himself at this distance or to be discomposed. [Guomin Gongbao, 6 Jan. 1913] In the White Paper, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama is quoted as having told the envoy sent by Beijing in 1919 that, It is not my true intention to be on intimate terms with the British. ... I swear to be loyal to our country and jointly work for the happiness of the five races. In that year an unofficial delegation came to Lhasa ostensibly to present religious offerings to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, but in reality to urge the Tibetan leader to negotiate an agreement with China. However, the Dalai Lama rejected the overture outright, and instead, called for tripartite negotiations in Lhasa. Likewise, the quotes attributed to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama to insinuate that he believed Tibet to be a part of China entirely contradict the authentic record of the visit to Lhasa of Liu Man- qing, a woman of mixed Tibetan and Chinese parentage, who arrived in Lhasa in 1930 in her private capacity. The record refers to a list of questions submitted by this woman to the Dalai Lama on behalf of the Chinese President and contains each of the Dalai Lama's responses. On relations with China and Chinese influence in Tibet the White Paper alleges that the Dalai Lama said: My greatest wish is for the real peace and unification of China. The record shows no mention of unification of or with China. Instead, the Dalai Lama said: For the stability of Tibet's religio-political order and happiness of its subjects, it may be better to hold negotiations and conclude treaties as this will result in dependable arrangements. On Tibet's independence and the border territories Tibet wanted returned from China, the Chinese White Paper alleges that the Dalai Lama said: Since it is all Chinese territory, why distinguish between you and us? The record shows, instead, that the Dalai Lama said: Under the priest-patron relationship that prevailed so far, Tibet has enjoyed wide independence. We wish to preserve this. We feel that there will be long-term stability if the territories we have lost to outsiders are returned to us. [Record of the 13th Dalai Lama's communication, dated 15th day of the 4th Tibetan Month, Iron-Horse Year 1930] Other Chinese envoys to Tibet, such as General Huang Mu-sung (1934), and Wu Zhong-xin (1940), were also told in no uncertain terms by the Tibetan Government that Tibet was and wished to remain independent. It may be stated here that neither the Chinese Government, nor its special envoy (Huang Mu-sung), had any role in the appointment of Rading Rinpoche as the regent after the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. Huang Mu-sung was the first Chinese to be permitted to enter Tibet in an official capacity since 1911. The Tibetans did not refuse him permission because he came to offer religious tribute and condolences for the late Dalai Lama. In the event, Huang Mu-sung arrived in Lhasa in April 1934, three months after Rading Rinpoche became the Regent. The Tsongdu (National Assembly) nominated three candidates for the regency, Rading Rinpoche, Gaden Tripa Yeshi Wangdhen and Phurchok Rinpoche. Out of them, Rading Rinpoche was selected through a lot-drawing ceremony conducted in front of the statue of Avalokitesvara in the Potala. [Thupten Tenthar Lhawutara in Bod kyi Lo rGyus Rig gNas dPyad gZhi'i rGyu cha bDams BsGrigs, Vol. 12, People's Publishing House, Beijing, 1990] In the White Paper, China claims that Tibetan Government officials were sent to participate in China's national assembly sessions in 1931 and 1946 in Nanjing. In fact, in 1931, Khenpo Kunchok Jungne was appointed by the Dalai Lama to set up a temporary liaison office in Nanjing and maintain contact with the Chinese Government. Likewise, the 1946 Tibetan mission was sent to Delhi and Nanjing to congratulate Britain, the United States and China on the Allied victory in the Second World War. They had no instruction or authority to attend any Chinese national assembly. Speaking about this to the International Commission of Jurists' Legal Inquiry Committee on 29 August 1959, the Dalai Lama said, They (Tibetan delegates in Nanjing) had no official part in the Assembly. When the propaganda came to the knowledge of our Government they were instructed by telegram not to attend. As for the establishment of the Commission for Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs by the Nationalist Guomindang Government, that too served only to keep up appearances: to this day, the Guomindang Government in Taiwan maintains this Commission which, it claims, not only has jurisdiction over Tibet, but also over the whole of Mongolia, including Outer Mongolia, whose independence has been internationally recognised since 1924. In fact, this Commission was not recognised by the Tibetan Government and never had any authority with respect to Tibet. UN Debates When Chinese Communist armies started entering Tibet in 1949, the Tibetan Government sent an urgent appeal to the United Nations to help Tibet resist the aggression. The General Assembly was advised by Britain and India not to take any action for the time being in order not to provoke a full-scale attack by China. But to most countries, China's attack on Tibet was aggression. This became evident especially during the full debates on the issue in the United Nations General Assembly in 1959, 1960, 1961 and 1965, when many governments echoed the sentiments expressed by the Ambassador of the Philippines who referred to Tibet as an independent nation and added: it is clear that on the eve of the Chinese invasion in 1950, Tibet was not under the rule of any foreign country. He described China's occupation as the worst type of imperialism, and colonialism past or present. The Nicaraguan representative condemned the Chinese invasion of Tibet and said: The people of America, born in freedom, must obviously be repelled by an act of aggression ... and particularly when it is perpetrated by a large state against a small and weak one. The Representative from Thailand reminded the Assembly that the majority of states refute the contention that Tibet is part of China. Similarly, the Government of the United States condemned and denounced Chinese aggression and their invasion of Tibet. Irish Representative Frank Aiken stated: For thousands of years, or for a couple of thousand years at any rate, (Tibet) was as free and as fully in control of its own affairs as any nation in this Assembly, and a thousand times more free to look after its own affairs than many of the nations here. [UN GA Docs A/PV 898 1960);A/PV 1394, 1401 1965] In fact, during those debates, it was only the Communist block which openly sided with China on the issue. From the official statements made during those debates, it is clear that China's assertion that no country ever recognised Tibet's independence or considered the military intervention to be aggression, is simply not true. Conclusion The Chinese Government cannot deny the fact that Tibet was independent between 1911 and 1951 without distorting history. Even China's last Head of Mission in Lhasa, Shen Tsung-Lien, wrote after leaving the country in 1948, Since 1911 Lhasa (ie, the Tibetan Government in Lhasa) has to all practical purposes enjoyed full independence. [Tibet and the Tibetans, Shen, T. and Liu, S., New York, 1973, p.62] Mao Zedong himself, when he passed through the border regions of Tibet during the Long March and was given food and shelter by local Tibetans, remarked, This is our only foreign debt, and some day we must pay the Mantzu (sic) and the Tibetans for the provisions we were obliged to take from them. [Red Star over China, Edgar Snow, New York, 1961, p.214. Emphasis added]. The origin and position of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama China's White Paper states, In 1653 and 1713, the Qing emperors granted honorific titles to the 5th Dalai Lama and the 5th Bainqen (Panchen) Lama, henceforth establishing the titles of the Dalai Lama and the Bainqen Erdini and their political and religious status in Tibet. The Dalai Lama ruled the bulk of areas from Lhasa while the Bainqen Erdini ruled the remaining area of Tibet from Xigatse (Shigatse). This claim is absolutely baseless. The Tibetan religious scholar and sage, Tsongkhapa (1357-1419), founded the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism. It became the fourth major school of Tibetan Buddhism, the others being the Nyingma, the Sakya and the Kagyu. Panchen Gedun Drup was Tsongkhapa's principal disciple. Panchen Gedun Drup's third reincarnation, Sonam Gyatso, was invited to the Mongol Court of Altan Khan who first conferred the title of Talai (Dalai) Lama on him. The title was applied retrospectively to his two previous incarnations, making him the Third Dalai Lama. Thus began the line of the Dalai Lamas. It is, therefore, not true, as Chinese propaganda claims, that the title Dalai Lama was first established by a Manchu emperor a century later. The relationship established by the Third Dalai Lama with Altan Khan was a spiritual one, but it would have political repercussions two centuries later, in 1642, when the Mongol prince, Gushri Khan, helped the Fifth Dalai Lama (Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso 1617-1682) to become the supreme political and spiritual ruler of Tibet. The Fifth Dalai Lama, in his turn, conferred the title of Chokyi Gyalpo (Dharma Raja) to his Mongol Patron. From that time on, successive Dalai Lamas ruled Tibet as sovereign heads of state. The political position of the Dalai Lamas was, therefore, not established by a Manchu emperor of the Qing Dynasty as claimed in the White Paper, but by the Fifth Dalai Lama with the help of his Mongol patron, two years before the Qing Dynasty was even established. Tashilhunpo Monastery was established in 1447 by Panchen Gedun Drup, retrospectively known as the First Dalai Lama. Successive abbots of Tashilhunpo monastery were given the title Panchen because of their scholarship. The Fifth Dalai Lama gave his teacher, Panchen Lobsang Chokyi Gyaltsen (1570-1662), the ownership of Tashilhunpo monastery and some additional estates. After that, the Panchen Lamas were selected on the basis of reincarnation, each successive Panchen Lama retaining ownership of the monastery and estates. This situation was common among many incarnate lamas, such as the Sakya, Phagpa-la, Dakyab Loden Sherab, etc, who had been given estates by the Tibetan Government. But this had absolutely no political significance. Contrary to Chinese Communist propaganda, the Panchen Lamas and other high lamas exercised religious authority only and were not involved in the political administration of any part of Tibet. In fact, the political authority of Shigatse and Tashilhunpo lay with the district governor appointed by Lhasa. Thus, the Manchu emperor played no role in the establishment of the religious or political status of the Dalai Lama, and none with respect to the Panchen Lama's position either. After the invasion of Tibet the Chinese Communist Government consistently tried to use the late Panchen Lama to legitimise its position in Tibet. Beijing appointed him to political positions and urged him to denounce and take the place of the Dalai Lama on a number of occasions. But the Panchen Lama refused to do so, and suffered many years of imprisonment and maltreatment as a result. The Chinese Government claims in the White Paper, as did past Guomindang Governments, that it played a decisive role, through its envoy Wu Zhong-xin, in the selection and installation of the 14th Dalai Lama in 1940, and states, ... the simple reality that the installation of the 14th Dalai Lama needed the approval of the (Chinese) national government is sufficient proof that Tibet did not possess any independent power during that period (1911-1949). In reality, the Dalai Lama was selected according to the age-old religious beliefs and traditions of the Tibetans and no approval of the Chinese Government was needed or sought. As a matter of fact, it was in 1939, before Wu's arrival in Lhasa, that the Regent Rading announced the name of the present Dalai Lama in the Tibetan National Assembly, which unanimously confirmed the candidate. When the enthronment ceremony took place on 22 February 1940, Wu, like envoys from Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and British India, had no special role. Sir Basil Gould, the British Political Officer who represented British India, explains that the official Chinese version of events was a fiction which had been prepared and published before the enthronement. That fictitious account by Wu Zhong-xin, which China today relies on, reflected what the Chinese had intended to happen, but what did not in fact occur. Chinese propaganda has also used a Chinese news report featuring a photograph of the Dalai Lama with Wu Zhong-xin, captioned as having been taken during the enthronement ceremony. But, according to Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, this photo was taken a few days after the ceremony, when Wu had a private audience with the Dalai Lama. Wu Zhong-xin's claim of having presided over the enthronement ceremony on the basis of this photograph is a blatant distortion of historical facts, Ngabo said in Tibet Daily on 31 August 1989. Early History According to Tibetan annals, the first king of Tibet ruled from 127 BC, but it was only in the seventh century AD that Tibet emerged as a unified state and a mighty empire under Emperor Songtsen Gampo. With his rule, an era of political and military greatness and territorial expansion started that lasted for three centuries. The King of Nepal and the Emperor of China offered their daughters to the Tibetan Emperor in marriage. The wedding to the Nepalese and Chinese princesses were of particular importance, because they played important roles in the spread of Buddhism in Tibet. Chinese propaganda always refers to political implications of Songtsen Gampo's wedding to the Chinese imperial princess Wen Cheng, conveniently ignoring the Tibetan ruler's other wives, particularly his Nepalese one, whose influence was, if anything, greater than that of her Chinese counterpart. Tibetan ruler Trisong Detsen (reign: 755-797) expanded the Tibetan empire by conquering parts of China. In 763, China's capital Chang'an (modern day Xian) was invaded and China had to pay an annual tribute to Tibet. In 783, a treaty was concluded which laid down the borders between Tibet and China. A pillar inscription at the foot of the Potala Palace in Lhasa bears witness to some of these conquests. The peace treaty concluded between Tibet and China in 821, is of particular importance in illustrating the nature of relations between these two great powers of Asia. The text of this treaty, both in Tibetan and Chinese, was inscribed on three stone pillars: one was erected in Gungu Meru to demarcate the borders between the two nations, second in Lhasa where it still stands, and the third in the Chinese capital of Chang'an. Passages quoted from the pillars in the White Paper are inaccurate and out of context, and aimed at creating the impression that some sort of union resulted from the treaty. Nothing is further from the truth, as is clear from the following principal passage of that treaty: Tibet and China shall abide by the frontiers of which they are now in occupation. All to the east is the country of great China; and all to the west is, without question, the country of great Tibet. Henceforth, on neither side shall there be waging of war nor seizing of territory. It is hard to see how China can, in its White Paper, interpret these events as showing that the Tibetans and Hans (Chinese) had, through marriage between royal families and meetings leading to alliances, cemented political and kinship ties of unity and political friendship, and formed close economic and cultural relations, laying a solid foundation for the ultimate founding of a unified nation. In fact, the historical records, both Tibetan and Chinese, contradict such an interpretation and refer to separate and powerful empires. In the mid-ninth century, the Tibetan state fragmented into several principalities. Tibetan attention focused on India and Nepal from where a strong religious and cultural influence brought on a major spiritual and intellectual renaissance. Relations with the Mongol Emperors (1240-1350) The Mongol ruler Genghis Khan and his successors conquered vast territories in Asia and Europe creating one of the largest empires the world has ever known, stretching from the Pacific to eastern Europe. In 1207, the Tangut empire north of Tibet fell to the advancing Mongols, and in 1271, the Mongols announced the establishment of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty to rule the Eastern part of the Empire. By 1279, the Chinese Song dynasty in southern China fell before the advancing armies and the Mongols completed their conquest of China. Today, China claims the Yuan Dynasty to be its own dynasty because, by doing so, it lays claim to all Mongol conquests, at least in the eastern half of the Mongol Empire. Prince Goden, grandson of Genghis Khan, dispatched an expedition to Tibet in 1240 and invited one of Tibet's leading religious hierarchs, Sakya Pandita Kunga Gyaltsen (1182-1251), to his court, thus establishing an enduring Tibetan-Mongol relationship. Here began the unique ch-yn (priest-patron) relationship. Kublai Khan, who succeeded Goden Khan, embraced Tibetan Buddhism and adopted Drogon Choegyal Phagpa, nephew of Sakya Pandita, as his spiritual mentor. This ch-yn relationship resulted in Kublai adopting Buddhism as his empire's state religion, and Phagpa became its highest spiritual authority. In gratitude, Kublai Khan offered his Tibetan lama political authority over Tibet in 1254, conferring various titles on him. These early ch-yn relationships were followed by many similar relationships between Mongol princes or Tibetan noble families and Tibetan lamas. This unique Central Asian relationship also formed the basis of later relations between Manchu emperors and successive Dalai Lamas. The ch-yn relationship itself was purely a personal one arising from the religious devotion of the Patron for the Priest and continued to exist even if the political status of the Patron changed. This was evident in the Mongol-Tibetan relationship, which continued to exist even after the fall of the Yuan Dynasty. An essential element of the ch-yn relationship was the protection that the Patron provided his Lama in return, not for the latter's allegiance, but for his religious teachings and blessings. Some ch-yn relationships acquired important political dimensions and the Patron was expected to provide military support to protect the Lama and his Teaching or church. Superiority of the protector was not implied, as the Chinese propaganda suggests, since the lay patron was the student and worshipper of his Lama. When Buddhism became the State religion in the eastern part of the Mongol empire and the Sakya Lama (Phagpa) its highest spiritual authority, the Mongol-Tibetan relationship could be best described in terms of mutual interdependence. This concept provided for dual political and religious paramountcy of the worldly emperor and the spiritual leader on the basis of equality and interdependence. While the spiritual leader depended on the emperor for protection and for backing in ruling Tibet, the conquering emperor depended on the lama to provide the legitimacy for his rule of the Mongol Empire. It is undeniable that Mongol Emperors spread their influence over Tibet. But, contrary to the assertion made in the Chinese White Paper that,"In the mid 13th century Tibet was officially incorporated into the territory of China's Yuan Dynasty", none of the Mongol rulers ever made any attempt to administer Tibet directly; Tibet did not even pay tax to the Mongol Empire, and it certainly was never considered part of China by the Mongol emperors. Tibet broke its political relationship with the Mongols in 1350 when the Tibetan king, Jangchub Gyaltsen (reign: 1350-1364), replaced the Sakya Lamas as the most powerful ruler of Tibet. Jangchub Gyaltsen did away with Mongol influences in the Tibetan administrative system and introduced a new and distinctly Tibetan one. He also enacted a Code of Law (Trimyig Shelchey Cho-nga, 15 Article Code), for the administration of justice in the kingdom. The Chinese regained their independence from Mongol rule and established the Ming dynasty eighteen years after that. Relations with Chinese Emperors (1368-1644) The White Paper claims that the Chinese Ming Dynasty replaced the Yuan Dynasty in China and inherited the right to rule Tibet. But, there is no historical basis for this assertion. As shown above, the relationship established between Mongol Khans or emperors and Tibetan lamas predated the Mongol conquest of China. Similarly, Tibet broke with the Mongol emperors before China regained its independence from them. The Chinese emperors of the Ming inherited no relationship from the Mongols. On the other hand, Mongol Khans continued to maintain their intensive religious and cultural ties with Tibetans, often in the form of ch-yn relationships, for centuries afterwards. Even if the Mongols did exercise influence in Tibet, it is still too presumptious on the part of China to claim Mongol inheritence when an independent Outer Mongolia exists as the only legitimate representative of the Mongolian people and nation. Contacts between Tibet and Ming China were scarce and largely limited to visits by individual lamas of various, sometimes rival, monasteries to China, and the granting of honorific imperial titles or gifts by the Chinese Emperor to them. These visits are recorded in Tibetan histories of the fifteenth to seventeenth century, but there is no evidence whatsoever of political subordination of Tibet or its rulers to China or the Ming emperors. In its White Paper, the Chinese Government alleges that these contacts with individual lamas demonstrate Ming authority in and over Tibet. But since Tibet was not ruled by any of those lamas, whatever the nature of their contacts may have been, they could not affect the independent status of Tibet. >From 1350, Tibet was ruled by the princes of Phagmodru and then, from about 1481, by the Rinpung dynasty. In 1406, the ruling Phagmodru prince, Dakpa Gyaltsen, turned down the Imperial invitation to him to visit China. This clearly shows the sovereign authority of Tibetan rulers at that time. From about 1565 until the rise to power of the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1642 (two years before the fall of the Ming Dynasty), the kings of Tsang ruled Tibet. There are indications of sporadic diplomatic relations between some of these rulers and Ming emperors, but the latter exercised neither authority nor influence over them. In 1644, the Chinese emperors were once again overthrown by foreign conquerors. The Manchus succeeded in establishing their own imperial dynasty, which ruled over a large empire, the most important part of which was China. They called it the Qing Dynasty. Relations with the Manchus (1639-1911) In 1642, the Great Fifth Dalai Lama, with the help of his Mongol patron Gushri Khan, became the supreme political and religious ruler of unified Tibet. Since then, Tibetans accepted him as their Gongsa Chenpo or The Supreme Sovereign. His prestige was recognised far beyond Tibet's borders. The Fifth Dalai Lama not only maintained a close relationship with the Mongols but also developed close ties with the Manchu rulers. In 1639, before the Dalai Lama acquired supreme political power and also before the Manchu conquest of China and the establishment of the Qing Dynasty, Manchu Emperor Tai Tsung invited the Dalai Lama to his capital, Mukden (present-day Shenyang). Unable to accept the invitation personally, the Dalai Lama sent his envoy who was treated with great respect by the Emperor. Thus the Ch-yn relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu rulers was established. As was true of the Tibetan relationship with the Mongol emperors, the links developed between Tibetans and the Manchu emperors did not involve China. As Owen Lattimore points out in reference to the Qing Dynasty, What existed in fact was a Manchu Empire, of which China formed only one part. [Studies in Frontier History] Having conquered China and annexed it to the Manchu empire, Emperor Shunzi invited the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1653 for a state visit to the Imperial capital. In an unprecedented sign of respect, the Manchu Emperor made a four-day journey outside his capital (Beijing) to receive the Tibetan sovereign and foremost spiritual leader of Central Asian Buddhists. Commenting on the Dalai Lama's visit, W.W. Rockhill, an American scholar and diplomat in China, wrote: (The Dalai Lama) had been treated with all the ceremony which could have been accorded to any independent sovereign, and nothing can be found in Chinese works to indicate that he was looked upon in any other light; at this period of China's relations with Tibet, the temporal power of the Lama, backed by the arms of Gusri Khan and the devotion of all Mongolia, was not a thing for the Emperor of China to question. [The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations With Emperors of China, 1644-1908, T'oung Pao 11, 1910, p.37] On this occasion, the Fifth Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperor bestowed unprecedented high complimentary titles upon each other and the ch-yn relationship was reaffirmed. In the White Paper, the Chinese Government refers only to the honorific title given by the Emperor to the Dalai Lama, but conveniently leaves out any mention of the similar honorific title granted by the Dalai Lama to the Emperor. Chinese propaganda infers that it was this deed by the Manchu Emperor which conferred the legal right to the Dalai Lama to rule Tibet. This interpretation intentionally misses the point of the event, namely that titles were exchanged by two sovereign leaders. If the Dalai Lama was dependent on his imperial title for the exercise of his authority, then so was the Manchu Emperor dependent on the title granted by the Dalai Lama for the exercise of his authority. Throughout the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) relations between Tibet and the Manchu emperors remained formally based on the ch-yn relationship. The Manchu Emperor readily responded to the appeals for help to drive out invading Dzungar Mongols and escort the newly discovered Seventh Dalai Lama to the Tibetan capital in 1720. Manchu forces entered Tibet on three more times in the eighteenth century, once to protect Tibet against invading Gorkha forces from Nepal (1792), and twice to restore order after civil wars (1728 and 1751). Each time they came at the request of the Tibetans, and each time the ch-yn relationship was invoked. The Manchus did succeed in establishing some degree of influence in Tibet during those crisis periods. But their influence declined rapidly afterwards, rendering them unable to play any role when Tibet fought wars against invaders from Jammu (1841- 1842), Nepal (1855-1856), and British India (1903-04). By the mid 19th century the Manchu Emperor's role (and the related role of the Amban) was only nominal. The White Paper devotes considerable attention to Emperor Qianlong's so-called 29-article edict, or regulations, of 1793 concerning Tibet, and to the appointment of Ambans (ambassadors). It presents the regulations as if they were an imperial order proving extensive Manchu authority in Tibet. In reality, the 29 points were suggestions made by the Emperor for certain reforms of the Government of Tibet following its war with Nepal. The Ambans were not viceroys or administrators, but were essentially ambassadors appointed to look after Manchu interests, and to protect the Dalai Lama on behalf of the Emperor. In 1792, the Gorkhas of Nepal invaded Tibet following a dispute between Tibet and Nepal and the Dalai Lama appealed to the Manchu Emperor for help. The Emperor sent a large army which helped Tibet drive out the Gorkhas, and mediated a treaty of peace between Tibet and Nepal. Since this was the fourth time the Emperor was asked to send troops to fight for the Tibetan Government, he wanted some say in Tibetan affairs in order to prevent Tibetans from becoming involved in conflicts which might again precipitate requests for Manchu military involvement. The regulations were suggestions made in the context of the Emperor's protector role, rather than an order from a ruler to his subjects. This emerges clearly from the statement made by the Imperial envoy and commander of the Manchu army, General Fu K'ang-an, to the Eighth Dalai Lama: The Emperor issued detailed instructions to me, the Great General, to discuss all the points, one by one, in great length. This demonstrates the Emperor's concern that Tibetans come to no harm and that their welfare be ensured in perpetuity. There is no doubt that the Dalai Lama, acknowledging his gratitude to the Emperor, will accept these suggestions once all the points are discussed and agreed upon. However, if the Tibetans insist on clinging to their age-old habits, the Emperor will withdraw the Ambans and the garrison after the troops are pulled out. Moreover, if similar incidents occur in the future, the Emperor will have nothing to do with them. The Tibetans may, therefore, decide for themselves as to what is in their favour and what is not or what is heavy and what is light, and make a choice on their own. [Quoted from Ya Han Chang's Biography of the Dalai Lamas in Bod kyi Lo rGyus Rag Rim g-Yu Yi Preng ba, Vol 2, Published by Tibet Institute of Social Science, Lhasa, 1991, p.316] Rather than accepting or rejecting the Emperor's points, Tibetans adopted some of the 29 points which were perceived to be beneficial to them, and disregarded those they thought to be unsuitable. As Panchen Choekyi Nyima, the predecessor of the Late Panchen Lama, said: Where Chinese policy was in accordance with their own views, the Tibetans were ready to accept the Amban's advice; but ... if this advice ran counter in any respect to their national prejudices, the Chinese Emperor himself would be powerless to influence them. [Diary of Capt. O'Connor, 4 September 1903] Among the important points of this 29-point edict was the Emperor's proposal for the selection of great incarnate lamas, including the Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lamas, by drawing lots from a golden urn. This important task, however, was the responsibility of the Tibetan Government and high lamas, who continued to select them according to religious traditions. Thus, already on the first occasion when the golden urn should have been employed, namely for the selection of the Ninth Dalai Lama in 1808, Tibetans disregarded it. Another important point of this edict was the role of Ambans. The Amban's role resembled that of an ambassador, at times, and that of a Resident in a classical protectorate relationship, at other times. It is best understood in the explanation Amban Yu Tai gave in 1903 to Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India (as reported by him) that, he was only a guest in Lhasa not a master and he could not put aside the real masters, and as such he had no force to speak of. [Sir Mortimer Durand: A Biography, by Sir Percy Sykes, London 1926, p.166] In the same sense, two Lazarist missionaries, Huc and Gabet, who were in Lhasa in the mid-nineteenth century, described the position of the Ambans as follows: the Government of Tibet resembles that of the Pope and the position occupied by the Chinese Ambassadors was the same as that of the Austrian Ambassador at Rome. [Decouverte du Thibet, 1845-1846, M. Huc, 1933, p.50] The reference to Chinese Ambassadors is a common mistake, because the Manchu Emperors were careful not to appoint Chinese Ambans but Manchus or Mongolians, a fact which stressed that the appointment of the Amban was also viewed in the context of the protector's role in the ch-yn relationship, a relationship from which the Chinese were excluded. The unprecedented invasion of Tibet by Manchu troops in 1908 was a turning point in relations between Tibet and the Manchu Emperor. Previous imperial military expeditions had come to assist the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government and at their invitation. But this time, the Manchu Emperor attempted to establish his authority in Tibet by force, largely in order to remove increasing British influence in Tibet. The Dalai Lama fled to neighbouring India, and the occupation of Tibet was short-lived. When the Manchu Emperor tried to depose the Dalai Lama in 1910, the Dalai Lama declared the termination of the ch- yn relationship. The protector had attacked his Lama and thereby violated the very foundation of their relationship. Resistance to the invasion succeeded when the Manchu Empire collapsed and Tibetans forced the occupying army to surrender. In the summer of 1912, Nepalese mediation between Tibet and China resulted in the conclusion of the Three Point Agreement providing for formal surrender and expulsion of all remaining Imperial troops. After returning to Lhasa, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama issued a proclamation reaffirming the independence of Tibet on 14 February 1913. Relations with British India (1857-1911) Since the end of the eighteenth Century, Britain developed a keen interest to open up trade with Tibet. Since all the Himalayan states which were closely linked to Lhasa had gradually been tied to British India by means of treaties and other agreements, Tibet feared it would also lose its independence if it did not resist British efforts to gain access to Tibet. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama steered Tibet on an independent course. This policy frustrated the British who feared, more than anything, a Russian infiltration into Tibet, which would tip the balance of power in Central Asia. Unable to communicate effectively with Tibet, Britain approached the Manchu Court for assistance in forcing Tibet to cooperate. The result was the conclusion, without Tibet's participation or knowledge, of two treaties (1890 and 1893) between Britain and China which had provisions regarding Tibet. The Tibetan Government rejected these treaties as ultra vires, and this precipitated the British invasion of Tibet in 1903. The Manchu Emperor did not come to the assistance of Tibet and, as noted by Amban Yu Tai, disclaimed any responsibility for the action of the Tibetans. British troops left Lhasa within a year, after concluding a bilateral treaty, the Lhasa Convention, with the Tibetan Government. The provisions of the Lhasa Convention necessarily pre-supposed the unrestricted sovereignty of Tibet in internal and external matters, otherwise, Tibet could not legitimately have transferred to Britain the powers specified in the treaty. The Lhasa Convention did not even acknowledge the existence of any special relationship between the Manchu Emperor and Tibet and constituted an implicit recognition by Britain of Tibet as a state competent to conclude treaties. In an effort to persuade China to cooperate, Britain convinced it to sign the Adhesion Agreement in 1906, once again, without participation of Tibet. That agreement and the 1907 agreement concluded between Britain and Russia, confirmed the existence of a sphere of British influence in Tibet and introduced the concept of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, something neither Tibet, nor the Manchu Court accepted. In 1908, during Tibet's brief invasion by the Manchu army, Britain, once again, signed a treaty with the Manchus, with no independent Tibetan participation, concerning trade with Tibet. Referring to the British concept of Suzerainty, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, explained: Chinese suzerainty over Tibet is a constitutional fiction a political affectation which has only been maintained because of its convenience to both parties. ... As a matter of fact, the two Chinese (ie, Manchu) Ambans at Lhasa are there not as Viceroys, but as Ambassadors. [Papers CD 1920, No.66, GoI to IO, 8 Jan. 1903. India Office Library] Relations with India When India became independent in 1947, it took over the British diplomatic Mission in Lhasa, and inherited the treaty relations of Britain with Tibet. Its recognition of Tibet was clear from the official communication the Indian Government sent to the Tibetan Foreign Office: The Government of India would be glad to have an assurance that it is the intention of the Tibetan Government to continue relations on the existing basis until new arrangements are reached on matters that either party may wish to take up. This is the procedure adopted by all other countries with which India has inherited treaty relations from His Majesty's Government. [Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed by the Governments of India and China, Vol 2, 1959, p.39] Self-determination China's White Paper speaks about its alleged ownership of Tibet, it discusses broad issues relating to human rights, including social, economic and cultural rights, but does not address the fundamental question of the right of the Tibetan people to self-determination. Under international law, populations which meet the criteria of a people, possess the right to self-determination. Governments may not deny that right, and must act in accordance with it. In past decades, the right to self-determination has primarily been applied to colonial countries and peoples, but, particularly in recent years, the right has been applied outside the context of decolonisation also. The Tibetan people clearly constitute a people under international law, as defined, among others, by the UNESCO International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples. It is difficult to conceive of a better example of a distinct people, with all the characteristics fulfilled: commonalities in history, language, culture, ethnicity and other manifestations of shared identity and experience; numerousness, ie, enough persons sharing common identity and experience to warrant recognition by the international community; the existence of institutions to give expression and effect to these commonalities; the will of a people to assert the right to self-determination. The right to self-determination means the right of a people to determine their own political status and to determine their economic, social and cultural development free of outside interference. [International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 1; and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 1;] Tibetans have been denied the exercise of this right since their country's invasion and occupation by China. Under international law, the PRC has the obligation to permit its exercise. The implementation of the right to self-determination can lead to integration with a state, association with a state or independence, but the choice must be made by the people exercising their right to self-determination. This choice must be made freely, without any interference from outside that people. Thus, it is for the Tibetan people alone, without interference from China, to make the choice. The Dalai Lama has, for many years, called on China to agree on the holding of an internationally-supervised plebiscite to determine the wishes of the Tibetan people. This, indeed, is the most desirable approach, which is entirely in accordance with the requirements of international law and practice. Recognition of Tibet's right to self-determination In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1723 (XVI), in which it explicitly recognised the right of the Tibetan people to self-determination. The UN called on the PRC to cease practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination. Four years later, in 1965, the UN General Assembly expressly reaffirmed this resolution in UNGA Res. 2079 (XX). Earlier, in 1959, the first Prime Minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru, expressed his strong support for the Tibetan people's right to self-determination. Addressing the Lok Sabha, Lower House of Indian Parliament, he said, the last voice in regard to Tibet should be the voice of the people of Tibet and nobody else. Recently, on two separate occasions, experts on the question of rights of peoples and international law met to consider the question of Tibet's claim to self-determination. The Permanent Peoples Tribunal, which met in Strasbourg for a week to hear extensive testimony and arguments in November 1992, found that the Tibetans meet the generally accepted legal criteria of a people with the right to self-determination and are therefore entitled to exercise the right to self- determination. The Tribunal concluded that the presence of the Chinese administration on Tibetan territory must be considered as foreign domination of the Tibetan people. Finally, in its Verdict, the Tribunal decided that, the Tibetan people have from 1950 been, continuously, deprived of their right to self- determination. [Session on Tibet, Verdict, Permanent Tribunal of Peoples, Strasbourg, 20 Nov., 1992, pp.15 and 23, resp.] In an unrelated conference, several weeks later, thirty eminent international lawyers from many countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas among them some of the world's foremost authorities on self-determination met in London for four days, to consider issues relating to the exercise of the right to self- determination by the Tibetan people. After extensive consideration of evidence, including China's White Paper, and after a lively legal debate, the conference participants concluded, in a written Statement, that: 1. under international law the Tibetan people are entitled to the right to self-determination, that this right belongs to the Tibetan people and that (i)t is not for the state apparatus of the PRC, or any other nation or state, to deny the Tibetan people's right to self-determination. 2. (s)ince the military action of 1949-50, Tibet has been under the alien occupation and domination of the PRC and has been administered with the characteristics of an oppressive colonial administration. 3. in the particular case of Tibet and having regard to its long history of separate existence, the Tibetan people's claim to self-determination, including independence, is compatible with the principles of national unity and territorial integrity of states. [International Lawyers' Statement on Tibet London 1993, London, 10 Jan. 1993, pp. 6-8]. The international conference statement called on the United Nations and the members of the international community urgently to take measures to promote an early implementation and realisation of the Tibetan people's right to self-determination. In both discussions, that of the Peoples' Tribunal and that of the International Lawyer's Conference, the points of view of the Chinese Government, in particular as expressed in the White Paper, were discussed at length and fully considered. The Chinese Government was invited to participate in both events, but declined to do so. It did, however, submit to the meetings for consideration the White Paper and numerous other publications stating its point of view and arguments. Conclusion The Tibetan people undoubtedly possess the right to self- determination, by virtue of which Tibetans have the right to determine their political status and their economic, social and cultural development. Even if self-determination is primarily applicable to peoples under colonial domination or occupation, Tibetans fully qualify. The time has come for the PRC to accept its international obligations and to agree to the holding of a plebiscite in Tibet under international supervision. Chapter 2. Invasion and illegal annexation of Tibet: 1949-1951 Introduction Treaties in international law are binding on the countries signing them, unless they are imposed by force or a country is coerced into signing the agreement by the threat of force. This is reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is regarded as a reflection of customary international law. The People's Republic of China (PRC) feels strongly about this principle, particularly as it applies to treaties and other agreements China was pressured to sign by Western powers at a time when China was weak. The PRC is particularly adamant that such unequal treaties and other agreements cannot be valid, no matter who signed them or for what reasons. After the military invasion of Tibet had started and the small Tibetan army was defeated, the PRC imposed a treaty on the Tibetan Government under the terms of which Tibet was declared to be a part of China, albeit enjoying a large degree of autonomy. In the White Paper, China claims this treaty was entered into entirely voluntarily by the Tibetan Government, and that the Dalai Lama, his Government and the Tibetan people as a whole welcomed it. The facts show a very different story, leading to the conclusion that the so-called 17 Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet was never validly concluded and was rejected by Tibetans. The Dalai Lama stated Tibetan Prime Minister Lukhangwa as having told Chinese General Zhang Jin-wu in 1952: It was absurd to refer to the terms of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. Our people did not accept the agreement and the Chinese themselves had repeatedly broken the terms of it. Their army was still in occupation of eastern Tibet; the area had not been returned to the government of Tibet, as it should have been. [My Land and My People, Dalai Lama, New York, Fourth Edition, 1992, p.95] Diplomatic activity and military threats Soon after the Communist victory against the Guomindang and the founding of the PRC on 1 October 1949, Radio Beijing began to announce that the People's Liberation Army must liberate all Chinese territories, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Hainan and Taiwan. Partly in response to this threat, and in order to resolve long-standing border disputes with China, the Foreign Office of the Tibetan Government, on 2 November 1949, wrote to Mao Zedong proposing negotiations to settle all territorial disputes. Copies of this letter were sent to the Governments of India, Great Britain and the United States. Although these three Governments considered the spread of Communism to be a threat to the stability of South Asia, they advised the Tibetan Government to enter into direct negotiations with Chinese Government as any other course of action might provoke military retaliation. The Tibetan Government decided to send two senior officials, Tsepon Shakabpa and Tsechag Thubten Gyalpo, to negotiate with representatives of the PRC in a third country, possibly the USSR, Singapore or Hong Kong. These officials were to take up with the Chinese Government the content of the Tibetan Foreign Office's letter to Chairman Mao Zedong and the threatening Chinese radio announcements still being made about an imminent liberation of Tibet; they were to secure an assurance that the territorial integrity of Tibet would not be violated and to state that Tibet would not tolerate interference. When the Tibetan delegates in Delhi applied for visas to Hong Kong, the Chinese told them that their new Ambassador to India was due to arrive in the capital shortly and that negotiations should be opened through him. In the course of negotiations, the Chinese Ambassador, Yuan Zhong-xian, demanded that the Tibetan delegation accept a Two- point Proposal: i) Tibetan national defence will be handled by China; and ii) Tibet should be recognised as a part of China. They were then to proceed to China in confirmation of the agreement. On being informed of the Chinese demands, the Tibetan Government instructed its delegates to reject the proposal. So negotiations were suspended. On 7 October 1950, 40,000 Chinese troops under Political Commissar, Wang Qiemi, attacked Eastern Tibet's provincial capital of Chamdo, from eight directions. The small Tibetan force, consisting of 8,000 troops and militia, were defeated. After two days, Chamdo was taken and Kalon (Minister) Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, the Regional Governor, was captured. Over 4,000 Tibetan fighters were killed. The Chinese aggression came as a rude shock to India. In a sharp note to Beijing on 26 October 1950, the Indian Foreign Ministry wrote: Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by Chinese government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronized with it and there naturally will be fear on the part of Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgement of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace. A number of countries, including the United States and Britain, expressed their support for the Indian position. The Tibetan National Assembly convened an emergency session in November 1950 at which it requested the Dalai Lama, only 16 at that time, to assume full authority as Head of State. The Dalai Lama was then requested to leave Lhasa for Dromo, near the Indian border, so that he would be out of personal danger. At the same time the Tibetan Foreign Office issued the followingstatement: Tibet is united as one man behind the Dalai Lama who has taken over full powers. ... We have appealed to the world for peaceful intervention in (the face of this) clear case of unprovoked aggression. The Tibetan Government also wrote to the Secretary General of the United Nations on 7 November 1950, appealing for the world body's intervention. The letter said, in part: Tibet recognises that it is in no position to resist the Chinese advance. It is thus that it agreed to negotiate on friendly terms with the Chinese Government. ...Though there is little hope that a nation dedicated to peace will be able to resist the brutal effort of men trained to war, we understand that the United Nations has decided to stop aggression wherever it takes place. On 17 November 1950, El Salvador formally asked that the aggression against Tibet be put on the General Assembly agenda. However, the issue was not discussed in the UN General Assembly at the suggestion of the Indian delegation who asserted that a peaceful solution which is mutually advantageous to Tibet, India and China could be reached between the parties concerned. A second letter by the Tibetan delegation to the United Nations on 8 December 1950 did not change the situation. Faced with the military occupation of Eastern and Northern Tibet, the defeat and destruction of its small army, the advance of tens of thousands of more PLA troops into Central Tibet, and the lack of active support from the international community, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government decided to send a delegation to Beijing for negotiations with the new Chinese leadership. Seventeen-Point Agreement In April 1951, the Tibetan Government sent a five-member delegation to Beijing, led by Kalon Ngapo Ngawang Jigme. The Tibetan Government authorised its delegation to put forward the Tibetan stand and listen to the Chinese position. But, contrary to the claim made in the White Paper that the delegation had full powers, it was expressly not given the plenipotentiary authority to conclude an agreement. In fact, it was instructed to refer all important matters to the Government. On 29 April negotiations opened with the presentation of a draft agreement by the leader of the Chinese delegation. The Tibetan delegation rejected the Chinese proposal in toto, after which the Chinese tabled a modified draft that was equally unacceptable to the Tibetan delegation. At this point, the Chinese delegates, Li Weihan and Zhang Jin-wu, made it plain that the terms, as they now stood, were final and amounted to an ultimatum. The Tibetan delegation was addressed in harsh and insulting terms, threatened with physical violence, and members were virtually kept prisoners. No further discussion was permitted, and, contrary to Chinese claims, the Tibetan delegation was prevented from contacting its Government for instructions. It was given the onerous choice of either signing the Agreement on its own authority or accepting responsibility for an immediate military advance on Lhasa. Under immense Chinese pressure the Tibetan delegation signed the Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet on 23 May 1951, without being able to inform the Tibetan Government. The delegation warned the Chinese that they were signing only in their personal capacity and had no authority to bind either the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government to the Agreement. None of this posed an obstacle to the Chinese Government to proceed with a signing ceremony and to announce to the world that an agreement had been concluded for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. Even the seals affixed to the document were forged by the Chinese Government to give it the necessary semblance of authenticity. The seventeen clauses of the Agreement, among other things, authorised the entry into Tibet of Chinese forces and empowered the Chinese Government to handle Tibet's external affairs. On the other hand, it guaranteed that China would not alter the existing political system in Tibet and not interfere with the established status, function, and powers of the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama. The Tibetan people were to have regional autonomy, and their religious beliefs and customs were to be respected. Internal reforms in Tibet would be effected after consultation with leading Tibetans and without compulsion. The full text of what came to be known as the Seventeen-Point Agreement was broadcast by Radio Beijing on 27 May 1951. This was the first time the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government heard of the devastating document. The reaction in Dromo (where the Dalai Lama was staying at that time) and Lhasa was one of shock and disbelief. A message was immediately sent to the delegation in Beijing, reprimanding them for signing the Agreement without consulting the Government for instructions. The delegation was asked to send the text of the document they had signed, and wait in Beijing for further instructions. In the meantime, a telegraphic message was received from the delegation to say that the Chinese Government representative, General Zhang Jin-wu, was already on his way to Dromo, via India. It added that some of the delegation members were returning, via India, and the leader of the delegation was returning directly to Lhasa. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government withheld the public repudiation of the Agreement. The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa on 17 August 1951 in the hope of re-negotiating a more favourable treaty with the Chinese. On 9 September 1951, around 3,000 Chinese troops marched into Lhasa, soon followed by some 20,000 more, from eastern Tibet and from Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) in the north. The PLA occupied the principal cities of Ruthok and Gartok, and then Gyangtse and Shigatse. With the occupation of all the major cities of Tibet, including Lhasa, and large concentration of troops throughout eastern and western Tibet, the military control of Tibet was virtually complete. From this position, China refused to re-open negotiations and the Dalai Lama had effectively lost the ability to either accept or reject any Tibet-China agreement. However, on the first occasion he had of expressing himself freely again, which came only on 20 June 1959, after his flight to India, the Dalai Lama formally repudiated the Seventeen-Point Agreement, as having been thrust upon Tibetan Government and people by the threat of arms. In assessing the 17-Point Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet and the occupation of Tibet two factors are crucial. First, the extent to which China was violating international law when the PLA marched into Tibet, and second, the effect of the signing of the Agreement. The law governing treaties is based on the universally recognised principle that the foundation of conventional obligations is the free and mutual consent of contracting parties and, conversely, that freedom of consent is essential to the validity of an agreement. Treaties brought about by the threat or the use of force lack legal validity, particularly if the coercion is applied to the country and government in question rather than only on the negotiators themselves. With China occupying large portions of Tibet and openly threatening a full military advance to Lhasa unless the treaty was signed, the agreement was invalid ab initio, meaning that it could not even be validated by a later act of acquiescence by the Tibetan Government. Contrary to China's claim in its White Paper, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government did not act voluntarily in signing the Agreement. In fact, Mao Zedong himself, in the Directive of Central Committee of CPC on the Policies for our Work in Tibet, issued on 6 April 1952, admitted: (N)ot only the two Silons (i.e., prime ministers) but also the Dalai and most of his clique were reluctant to accept the Agreement and are unwilling to carry it out. ... As yet we do not have a material base for fully implementing the agreement, nor do we have a base for this purpose in terms of support among the masses or in the upper stratum. [Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, Vol. 5, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1977, p.75] Chapter 3. National Uprising Introduction When people are oppressed, they are likely to rise up against the oppressor. There was never a popular uprising in Tibet until the 1950s. Tibetan resistance movement against the Chinese started right from the time of invasion. By 1956 open fighting broke out in the Eastern Tibetan provinces of Kham and Amdo. Three years later the uprising took on national proportions, leading to the massive demonstrations in Lhasa in March 1959, the flight of the Dalai Lama and some 80,000 refugees to neighbouring countries. Tens of thousands of Tibetans were slaughtered by the PLA. Since then, Tibetan uprising and demonstrations have continued. Between 1987 and 1992 alone, there had been over 150 demonstrations in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet, some small but others very large. The Chinese troops suppressed most of these demonstrations with brutal force. In March 1989 Tibet was put under Martial Law for the second time in its history: the first time was in 1959. The Chinese Government tries to depict the popular resistance of Tibetans as the work of a few disgruntled aristocrats who wish to restore the old system of exploitation and oppression of the Tibetan masses. It depicts 95 per cent of the Tibetans as having been serfs, brutally oppressed by a small number of aristocrats and lamas. What China cannot explain is why these allegedly oppressed masses never rose up against their masters, despite the fact that Tibet did not have a national police force and for most of its history had no strong army. Yet, these same Tibetans did rise up, and still do today, against the massive security apparatus and army of China, knowing the tremendous risk they take. If we look at the social composition of the Tibetans involved in the successive uprisings and demonstrations, more than 80 per cent of them are not aristocrats and high lamas. Furthermore, more than 85 per cent of Tibetans in exile belong to what the Chinese would call serf class. Events leading up to the 1959 National Uprising Let us look briefly at the main causes of the Tibetan people's uprising against China in 1959. Following the entry of Chinese troops into Lhasa, every effort was made to undermine the sovereign authority of the Tibetan Government and impose Chinese authority. This was carried out in three ways: First, political and regional divisions were created among Tibetans under the policy of divide and rule. Secondly, certain social and economic reforms, calculated to change the fabric of Tibetan society, were instituted against the wishes of Tibetans. Thirdly, various organs of the Chinese Government, and new bodies under their authority, were set up alongside the existing Tibetan institutions. Between 24 November 1950 and 19 October 1953, China incorporated a large portion of Kham province into neighbouring Chinese Sichuan province. Kham was divided into two so-called Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures and one Tibetan Autonomous District. On 13 September 1957, another portion of southern Kham was named the Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and put under Yunnan Province. The bulk of Amdo, together with a small area of Kham, was reduced to the status of a Chinese province, and named as Qinghai. One portion of Amdo was named Ngapa Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and merged with Sichuan Province. The remaining area of Amdo was sub-divided into Tianzhu Tibetan Autonomous District (6 May 1950), and Kanlho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (1 October 1953), and incorporated into the Chinese province of Gansu. On 9 September 1965, China formally established the so-called Tibet Autonomous Regional government, placing under its administration the whole of U-Tsang and parts of Kham area. China stripped numerous ethnic Tibetans like the Sherpas, Monpas, Lhopas, Tengpas, Jangpas, etc, who consider themselves to be Tibetan, of their Tibetan identity, classifying them as distinct Chinese minorities. The appropriation by the People's Liberation Army of thousands of tons of barley and other foodstuffs pushed the Tibetans to the brink of famine for the first time in history and prompted protest meetings in Lhasa. The first major popular resistance group, the Mimang Tsongdu (People's Assembly), banded together spontaneously and handed the Chinese Military Command a petition demanding withdrawal of the PLA and an end to Chinese interference in Tibetan affairs. The Chinese reaction was swift: the two Tibetan Prime Ministers, Lukhangwa and Ven. Lobsang Tashi, who had made no secret of their opposition to Chinese rule and opposed the 17-Point Agreement, were forced to resign and five Mimang Tsongdu leaders were jailed, driving the organisation underground. In 1954, the the Dalai Lama visited Beijing on China's invitation. The special autonomous position of Tibet, embodied in the Seventeen-Point Agreement, was formally abolished with the adoption of the new Constitution by the Chinese People's Congress. This was followed by the adoption of the Resolution on the Establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet (PCART), a measure designed to further integrate the administration of Tibet into that of PRC. The Preparatory Committee was to function as the central administration of Tibet instead of the Tibetan Government. The Dalai Lama was made its Chairman, but without any authority. As the Dalai Lama explained in his autobiography: The Committee was powerless a mere facade of Tibetan representation behind which all the effective power was exercised by the Chinese. In fact, all basic policy was decided by another body called the Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Tibet, which had no Tibetan members. [Dalai Lama, Ibid, p.133] In 1956, PCART was set up and the Tashilhunpo estate, and those regions under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Chamdo (a Tibetan Government appointee) in Eastern Tibet, were separated from the jurisdiction of the Tibetan Government in Lhasa and their administrative organs given equal status as the Tibetan Government, thereby reducing the authority of the Tibetan Government. Social, political, and agrarian reforms were imposed by the Chinese Government in Amdo and Kham and, to a much lesser degree, in the rest of the country. Frequent attacks were launched on religious personages and monasteries. All of these led to increasingly violent reactions. The 17-Point Agreement guaranteed that no reforms would be forced on the Tibetans. But in Eastern Tibet they were introduced and enforced at once. Mounting impatience and belligerence of the Chinese administrators provoked violent reactions and rapidly culminated into armed conflicts in a widening spiral of resistance and military repression that engulfed the entire eastern Tibetan provinces of Kham and Amdo. As the violence spilled over to other areas of Tibet, a full- scale guerrilla warfare broke out in the summer of 1956. Refugees from eastern and northeastern Tibet began to arrive in Lhasa in large numbers. Within a year, the uprising had spread to Central Tibet, and in 1958 Tensung Dhanglang Magar, (the Voluntary Force for the Defense of the Faith), a union of the Mimang Tsongdu and Chushi Gangduk (Four Rivers Six Ranges) organisations, was founded. By the autumn of that year this popular army, estimated at 80,000 men, was in control of most districts of Southern Tibet and parts of Eastern Tibet. The Dalai Lama took pains to calm his people so as to prevent worse bloodbath. Nevertheless, the situation in Tibet deteriorated rapidly while the Dalai Lama visited India, in 1956, to take part in the Buddha Jayanti celebration at the invitation of independent India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. In meetings with Nehru and Zhou Enlai in Delhi, the Dalai Lama expressed his deep concern at the explosive situation in his homeland and admitted he was contemplating seeking political asylum in India. Nehru advised the Dalai Lama against it. To induce the Dalai Lama to return home, the Chinese Government promptly announced that the socialist and democratic reforms would be postponed in Tibet for the time being. It was also agreed that a number of Chinese civil personnel would be withdrawn, and the PCART's departments would be reduced by half. This turned out to be a false promise. In the years that followed, the Chinese intensified socialist campaigns and purges against Tibetans and sent considerable army reinforcements to Tibet, thus more than offsetting the earlier modest reduction of Chinese cadres. National Uprising and flight of the Dalai Lama The inevitable showdown occurred in March 1959. There was general fear that the Chinese were planning to abduct the Dalai Lama and take him away to Beijing. The Tibetan people already had bitter experiences in Kham and Amdo, where important lamas and local leaders disappeared mysteriously after being invited to Chinese cultural shows and other functions. Fears for the safety of the Dalai Lama became acute when the Chinese Army Command invited the Tibetan leader to a theatrical show in the military barracks on 10 March. Tibetans became even more suspicious when the Chinese instructed that the Dalai Lama be not accompanied by bodyguards as was the tradition. The people in Lhasa would not allow the Dalai Lama to give in to the Chinese subterfuge. On 10 March 1959, a massive demonstration was held and thousands of people surrounded the Dalai Lama's Summer Palace, the Norbulingkha, to prevent the Dalai Lama from attending the Chinese show. For the next few days, mass meetings were held in Lhasa with the citizens demanding that the Chinese quit Tibet and restore the country's full independence. The Dalai Lama, fearing the explosive consequences of these mass demonstrations, urged the large crowd before the Norbulingkha to disperse and wrote three letters to the principal Chinese General, Tian Guan-san, in an effort to placate the Chinese and stave off impending violence. Explaining the circumstances in which he wrote these letters, the Dalai Lama says in his autobiography: I replied to all his letters to gain time time for anger to cool on both sides and time for me to urge moderation of the Lhasa people... my most urgent moral duty at that moment was to prevent a totally disastrous clash between my unarmed people and the Chinese army. [Dalai Lama, Ibid, p.187] But, despite the Dalai Lama's efforts, open fighting broke out in Lhasa soon afterwards, with disastrous consequences to the Tibetans. Seeing that all efforts to prevent open confrontation and bloodshed had ultimately failed, and that cooperation with the Chinese authorities to minimise their oppression was no longer possible, the Dalai Lama decided to escape to India to appeal for international help to save his people. He left Lhasa on the night of 17 March. On 28 March 1959, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai issued an Order of State Council dissolving the Government of Tibet. The Dalai Lama and his ministers, while still en route to India, reacted promptly by declaring that the new administration installed in Lhasa, which was totally controlled by the Chinese, would never be recognised by the people of Tibet. Upon his arrival in India, the Dalai Lama re-established the Tibetan Government in exile and publicly declared, Wherever I am, accompanied by my government, the Tibetan people recognise us as the Government of Tibet. Within months, around 80,000 Tibetans reached the borders of India, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim after arduous escapes. Many more could not even make it to the border. China's White Paper tries to portray these events as the work of a handful of Tibetan reactionaries who, with the help of the CIA, created an armed rebellion which was resolutely opposed by the masses. The Dalai Lama was carried away under duress to India, the White Paper states. The resistance, they claim, amounted to no more than 7,000 rebels, and was put down easily in two days. This view is hardly credible and has been contradicted even by the Chinese authorities themselves. Chinese army intelligence reports admit that the PLA killed 87,000 members of the Tibetan resistance in Lhasa and surrounding areas between March and October 1959 alone. [Xizang Xingshi he Renwu Jiaoyu de Jiben Jiaocai, PLA Military District's Political Report, 1960] The CIA's half-hearted assistance to the Tibetan resistance started in earnest only after the uprising, and, though welcomed by Tibetans, amounted to little. All the evidence shows that the uprising was massive, popular and widespread. The brutal repression which followed in all regions of Tibet only confirms this. Chapter 4. Traditional society and democratic framework for future Tibet Introduction China has always justified its policy in Tibet by painting the darkest picture of traditional Tibetan society. The military invasion and occupation has been termed a liberation by China of Tibetan society from medieval feudal serfdom and slavery. Today, this myth is repeatedly rehashed to justify China's own violations of human and political rights in Tibet, and to counter all international pressure on Beijing to review its repressive policies in occupied Tibet. Traditional Tibetan society was, by no means, perfect and was in need of changes. The Dalai Lama and other Tibetan leaders have admitted as much. That is the reason why the Dalai Lama initiated far-reaching reforms in Tibet as soon as he assumed temporal authority. The traditional Tibetan society, however, was not nearly as bad as China would have us believe. Whatever the case may be, for several reasons the Chinese justifications make no sense. First of all, international law does not accept justifications of this type. No country is allowed to invade, occupy, annex and colonize another country just because its social structure does not please it. Secondly, the PRC is responsible for bringing more suffering in the name of liberation. Thirdly, necessary reforms were initiated and Tibetans are quite capable of doing so. In its 1960 report on Tibet, the International Commission of Jurists stated that: Chinese allegations that the Tibetans enjoyed no human rights before the entry of the Chinese were found to be based on distorted and exaggerated accounts of life in Tibet. Accusations against the Tibetan rebels of rape, plunder and torture were found to have been deliberately fabricated and in other cases unworthy of belief for this and other reasons. Traditional Society In terms of social mobility and wealth distribution, independent Tibet compared favourably with most Asian countries. The Dalai Lama, head of both the spiritual and secular administration, was found through a system of reincarnation that ensured that the rule of Tibet did not become hereditary. Most of the Dalai Lamas, including the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth, came from common, peasant families in remote parts of Tibet. Every administrative post below the Dalai Lama was held by an equal number of monk and lay officials. Although lay officials hereditarily held posts (however, the posts themselves were not hereditary), those of monks were open to all. A large proportion of monk officials came from non-privileged backgrounds. Tibet's monastic system provided unrestrained opportunities for social mobility. Admission to monastic institutions in Tibet was open to all and the large majority of monks, particularly those who rose through its ranks to the highest positions, came from humble backgrounds, often from far-flung villages in Kham and Amdo. This is because the monasteries offered equal opportunities to all to rise to any height through their own scholarship. A popular Tibetan aphorism says: If the mother's son has the knowledge, the golden throne of Gaden (the highest position in the hierarchy of the Gelug School of Tibetan Buddhism) has no ownership. The peasants, whom the Chinese White Paper insists on calling serfs, had a legal identity, often with documents stating their rights, and also had access to courts of law. Peasants had the right to sue their masters and carry their case in appeal to higher authorities. Ms Dhondup Chodon comes from a family that was among the poorest social strata in independent Tibet. Reminiscing her life before the Chinese occupation in her book, Life in the Red Flag People's Commune, she said: I belong to what the Chinese now term as serfs of Tibet. ... There were six of us in the family. ... My home was a double-storeyed building with a walled compound. On the ground floor we used to keep our animals. We had four yaks, 27 sheep and goats, two donkeys and a land-holding of four and a half khel (0.37 hectares). ... We never had any difficulty earning our livelihood. There was not a single beggar in our area. Throughout Tibetan history, the maltreatment and suppression of peasants by estate-holders was forbidden by law as well as by social convention. From the time of the seventh-century Tibetan Emperor Songtsen Gampo, many Tibetan rulers issued codes based on the Buddhist principle of Ten Virtues of the Dharma. The essence of this was that the rulers should act as parents to their subjects. In 1909, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama issued a regulation conferring on all peasants the right to appeal directly to him in case of mistreatment by estate holders. As a matter of fact, Tibetan society frowns upon unkind acts. The Tibetan Buddhist belief in compassion acts as a check on uncharitable deeds not only against fellow human beings, but even against animals. Capital punishment was banned in Tibet, and physical mutilation was a punishment that could be inflicted by the Central government in Lhasa alone. In 1898, Tibet enacted a law abolishing such forms of punishment, except in cases of high treason or conspiracy against the state. All land belonged to the state which granted estates, to monasteries and to individuals who had rendered service to the state. The state, in turn, received revenues and service from estate holders. Lay estate holders either paid land revenues or provided one male member in each generation to work as a government official. Monasteries performed religious functions for the state and, most vitally, served as schools, universities and centres for Tibetan art, craft, medicine and culture. The role of monasteries as highly disciplined centres of Tibetan education was the key to the traditional Tibetan way of life. Monasteries bore all expenses for their students and provided them with free board and lodging. Some monasteries had large estates, some had endowments which they invested. But other monasteries had neither of these. They received personal gifts and donations from devotees and patrons. The revenue from these sources were often insufficient to provide the basic needs of large monk populations in some monasteries. To supplement their income, some monasteries engaged in trade and acted as money lenders. The largest proportion of land in old Tibet was held by peasants who paid their revenue directly to the state, and this became the main source of the government food stocks which were distributed to monasteries, the army, and officials without estates. Some paid in labour, and some were required to provide transport service to government officials, and in some cases to monasteries. Land held by the peasant was heritable. He could lease it to others or mortgage it. He could be dispossessed of his land only if he failed to pay the dues of produce or labour, which were not excessive. In practice, he had the rights of a free-holder, and dues to the state were a form of land tax paid in kind rather than rent. A small section of the Tibetan population, mostly in U-Tsang province, were tenants. They held their lands on the estates of aristocrats and monasteries, and paid rent to the estate-holders either in kind or they sent one member of the family to work as a domestic servant or an agricultural labourer. Some of these tenant farmers rose to the powerful position of estate secretary. (For this, they were labelled by the Chinese as agents of feudal lords.) Other members of these families had complete freedom. They were entitled to engage in any business, follow any profession, join any monastery or work on their own lands. Although they were known as tenants, they could not be evicted from their lands at the whim of estate holders. Some of the tenants were quite wealthy. The present Fourteenth Dalai Lama attempted to introduce far- reaching administrative and land reforms. He proposed that all large estate holdings of monasteries and individuals be acquired by the state for distribution amongst peasants. He created a special reform committee which reduced land tax on peasants. The reform committee was authorised to hear and redress complaints by individuals against the district or local authorities. He approved the proposal for debt exemption submitted by this committee. Peasant debtors were categorised into three groups: those who could not pay either their accumulated interest or repay capital were freed from debt altogether; those who could not pay the interest out of their annual earnings, but had saved up enough to repay the capital, were ordered to make repayments in instalments and those who had become wealthy over the course of years were made to pay both capital and interest in instalments. The Dalai Lama ordered that in future no transport service should be demanded without the special sanction of the government. He also increased the rates to be paid for transport service. Famine and starvation were unheard of in independent Tibet. There were, of course, years of poor harvest and crop failures. But people could easily borrow from the buffer stock held by the district administrations, monasteries, aristocrats and rich farmers. From 1950 onwards, the Chinese military and civilian personnel were fed on the state buffer stocks and forced the Tibetan populace to sell their personal holding of grains to them for nominal prices. Liberation was, in reality, the right to equal poverty for all. Palden Gyatso, a 61-year-old monk who escaped from Tibet in 1992 after serving 33 years in Chinese jails and labour camps, puts it succinctly: The Chinese definitely succeeded in making the rich poor. But they did not help the poor. The poor became poorer and we were reduced to a nation of tsampa beggars. In his book, Tibet and its History, Hugh Richardson wrote: Even communist writers have had to admit there was no great difference between rich and poor in (pre-1949) Tibet. In fact, when Hu Yaobang saw the extent of the poverty in Central Tibet in 1980, he stated that the living standard should be brought up at least to the pre-1959 level. Democratic reforms In 1959, the Dalai Lama re-established his Government in India, soon after his flight from Tibet, and a series of democratic changes were initiated. A popularly elected body of people's representatives, parliament-in-exile, was constituted. In 1961 the Dalai Lama prepared a draft constitution for future Tibet and sought the opinion of Tibetans on this matter. In 1963, a detailed draft constitution for a future Tibet was promulgated. Despite strong opposition, the Dalai Lama insisted on the inclusion of a clause which stated that the executive powers of the Dalai Lama shall be exercised by the Council of Regents when the National Assembly, by majority of two-thirds of its total members in consultation with the Supreme Court, decides that this is in the highest interests of the State. On 10 March 1969, the Dalai Lama announced that on the day Tibet regained its independence the Tibetan people must decide for themselves as to what kind of system of government they wanted. In 1990, further changes were introduced by increasing the strength of the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies (ATPD) from 12 to 46. It was given more constitutional powers such as the election of the kalons (ministers), who were previously appointed directly by the Dalai Lama. The Supreme Justice Commission was set up to look into people's grievances against the Administration. In January 1992, the Dalai Lama announced the Guidelines for future Tibet's Polity and the Basic Features of its Constitution, wherein he stated that he would not play any role in the future government of Tibet, let alone seek the Dalai Lama's traditional political position. The future government of Tibet, the Dalai Lama said, would be elected by the people on the basis of adult franchise. The Dalai Lama also announced that during the transition period, between withdrawal of the repressive Chinese troops from Tibet and the final promulgation of the Constitution, the administrative responsibilities of the state will be entrusted to the Tibetan functionaries presently working in Tibet. During this transitional period, an interim president will be appointed to whom the Dalai Lama will delegate all his political powers and responsibilities. The Tibetan Government-in- Exile will ipso facto cease to exist. The guidelines for Tibet's future polity also stated: Future Tibet shall be a peace-loving nation, adhering to the principle of ahimsa (non-violence). It shall have a democratic system of government committed to preserving a clean, healthy and beautiful environment. Tibet shall be a completely demilitarised nation. The Tibetan struggle is, thus, not for the resurrection of the traditional system as the Chinese claim. The continuous Chinese attempts at personalising the Tibetan issue to hinge upon the Dalai Lama's own status is a subterfuge to mask the main issue of the Tibetan national struggle. Chapter 5. Human rights Introduction Over 1.2 million Tibetans have died as a direct result of the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet. Today, it is hard to come across a Tibetan family that has not had at least one member imprisoned or killed by the Chinese regime. According to Jigme Ngabo, after the suppressions of 1959 and 1969, almost every family in Tibet has been affected in some way. These facts speak volumes about the democratic reform China claims to have brought to the dark, feudal exploitative society of Tibet. Independent Tibet was certainly not an embodiment of perfect human society. But it was, by no means, nearly as tyrannical as it is today under Chinese rule. Its two biggest prisons, located in Lhasa, had, at any one time, no more than 30 inmates each. But, following Chinese invasion the whole of Tibet has been turned into a vast network of prisons and labour camps. There are reports that China even resorted to massacre of prisoners to keep the prison population within manageable limits. However, China continues to claim that since its liberation, the people of Tibet have enjoyed wide measures of liberty and freedom. Let us examine the facts. 1949-1979: Killings and destructions According to one Chinese source, the PLA exterminated more than 5,700 Tibetan soldiers, and imprisoned more than 2,000 in different areas of eastern Tibet between 7 and 25 October, 1950. [A Survey of Tibet Autonomous Region, Tibet People's Publishing House, 1984] Accounts of massacres, tortures and killings, bombardment of monasteries, extermination of whole nomad camps are well documented. Quite a number of these reports have been also documented by the International Commission of Jurists' 1960 report on Tibet. According to a secret Chinese military document, the PLA crushed 996 rebellions in Kanlho, Amdo, over the period 1952-58, killing over 10,000 Tibetans. [Work Report of the 11th PLA Division, 1952-1958] Similarly, the population of another Amdo area of Golok had its population reduced from about 130,000 in 1956 to about 60,000 in 1963.[China Spring, June 1986] Speaking about the same area, the Panchen Lama said: If there was a film made on all the atrocities perpetrated in Qinghai Province, it would shock the viewers. In Golok area, many people were killed and their dead bodies rolled down the hill into a big ditch. The soldiers told the family members and relatives of the dead people that they should celebrate since the rebels have been wiped out. They were even forced to dance on the dead bodies. Soon after, they were also massacred with machine guns. [Speech by the Panchen Lama at a meeting of the Sub-Committee of the National People's Congress in Peking on situation in Tibet, 28 March 1987] The Panchen Lama specifically pointed out: In Amdo and Kham, people were subjected to unspeakable atrocities. People were shot in groups of ten or twenty. ... Such actions have left deep wounds in the minds of the people. In a crackdown operation launched in the wake of the National Uprising of 10 March 1959 in Lhasa, 10,000 to 15,000 Tibetans were killed within three days. According to a secret 1960 PLA Tibet Military District Political Department report, between March 1959 and October 1960, 87,000 Tibetans were killed in Central Tibet alone. [Xizang Xingshi he Renwu Jiaoyu de Jiben Jiaocai, 1960] According to information compiled by the Tibetan Administration in exile, over 1.2 million Tibetans died between 1949 and 1979. MODE OF DEATHU-TSANGKHAMAMDOTOTALTortured in prison93,56064,87714,784173,221Executed28,26732,26696,225156,758Killed in Fighting143,253240,41049,042432,705Starved to death131,07289,916121,982342,970Suicide3,3753,9521,6759,00 "Struggled" to death27,95148,84015,94092,731Total:-427,478480,261299,6481,207,3 87 Deaths in prisons and labour and concentration camps Compilation of figures based on testimonies of survivors of prisons and labour camps show that throughout Tibet about 70 per cent of the inmates died. For example, in the wilderness of the northern Tibetan plains at Jhang Tsalakha more than 10,000 prisoners were kept in five prisons and forced to mine and transport borax. According to some of the survivors of these camps, every day 10 to 30 died from hunger, beating and overwork; in a year more than 8,000 had died. Likewise, in the construction of Lhasa Ngachen Hydro-electric Power Station, now falsely claimed to have been built by the PLA, everyday at least three or four dead prisoners were seen being thrown into the nearby river or burnt. To cite an example from eastern Tibet, from 1960 to 1962, 12,019 inmates died at a lead mine in Dartsedo district, according to a former inmate, Mrs. Adhi Tap from Nyarong, Kham. Human rights in Tibet today The death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 resulted in a change in Chinese policies. The signal tune of that change was economic liberalisation and openness, and even some degree of leniency on political prisoners. But liberalisation and openness, as it turned out, did not signal a change of attitude towards political freedom in Tibet. In May 1982, 115 Tibetan political activists were arrested and branded as delinquents and black marketeers. More arrests and public executions followed. By the end of November 1983, 750 Tibetan political activists had been jailed in Lhasa alone. On 27 September 1987, more than 200 Tibetans staged a demonstration in Lhasa. In the clamp down which followed on successive demonstrations including the ones on 1 October 1987 and 5 March 1988 Chinese police opened fire, killing and critically wounding many on the spot and imprisoning at least 2,500. In July 1988, China's security chief, Qiao Shi, while on a tour of the TAR announced merciless repression of all forms of protest against Chinese rule in Tibet. [UPI, 20 July 1988] The policy was implemented at once. The crackdown on the 10 December 1988 demonstration at Jokhang, the most sacred Tibetan shrine in Lhasa, was witnessed by a Dutch tourist, Christa Meindersma (26 at the time), who recalled: ... without any warning, the police opened fire, shooting quite indiscriminately into the crowd. They didn't seem to mind who they hit. ... as I turned to run I was shot in the shoulder. According to a western journalist who happened to be there, at least one officer was heard ordering his men to kill the Tibetans. The toll on that day was at least 15 killed, over 150 seriously wounded, and many others arrested. However, for three days from 5 March 1989 Lhasa was, once again, in turmoil, with demonstrators waving the Tibetan flag and shouting for independence. During the police crackdown, automatic weapons were fired even into some homes. Estimates of deaths varied from 80 to 400. The official Chinese figure was only 11. According to Tang Da-xian, a Chinese journalist who was in Lhasa at the time, some four hundred Tibetans were massacred, several thousand were injured and three thousand were imprisoned. [Events in Lhasa March 2nd-10th 1989, Tang Daxian, London, TIN, 15 June 1990] At midnight on 7 March 1989, martial law was formally imposed in Lhasa. About a year later, on 1 May 1990, China announced the lifting of martial law. 1990. However, as pointed out by the first Australian Human Rights Delegation to China, which was permitted to visit Tibet in July 1991: Though martial law had indeed been lifted on 1 May 1990, it continues to exist in all but name. Amnesty International (AI), in its 1991 report, also confirmed this, adding, the police and security forces retained extensive powers of arbitrary arrest and detention without trial. In the run up to China's celebration of the 40th anniversary of its annexation of Tibet, 146 criminals were arrested on 10 April 1991, and this was followed by more arrests announced at public sentencing rallies. On the day of the celebration the whole of Lhasa was put under curfew. In a sudden clampdown, starting in February 1992, groups of ten Chinese personnel raided Tibetan houses in Lhasa and arrested anyone found in possession of anything deemed subversive; these included photographs, and tapes or books containing speeches or teachings of the Dalai Lama. Over 200 were arrested. Despite all measures of repression, demonstrations continued throughout Tibet after 1987. Available reports confirm that between 27 September 1987 and end of 1992, there had been more than 150 demonstrations of various sizes throughout Tibet. Violation of human rights of concern to Amnesty International in Tibet include the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience and of other political prisoners after unfair trials, torture and ill- treatment of detainees, the use of the death penalty and extra judicial executions. Constitutional and legal provisions in Tibet restrict the exercise of basic freedoms and lack human rights safeguards consistent with international standards. [People's Republic of China: Amnesty International's Concerns in Tibet, AI, London, January 1992, ASA 17/02/92, summary page] All such manifestations (i.e., demonstrations and political dissent) of dissatisfaction with Chinese rule whether peacefully conducted or otherwise are viewed by the authorities as constituting `illegal separatist activity', and those who have led or participated in them have been punished with escalating force and severity. `Merciless repression' remains, in Tibet, the order of the day. [Merciless Repression: Human Rights in Tibet, Asia Watch, Washington, DC] Human rights violation in Tibet is all pervasive. Available evidences suggest that China violates with impunity every norm of civilised conduct as laid down in international law books, many of which it has undertaken to observe by affirmative acts of ratification, such as the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture), and customary laws of nations such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, disappearances and summary executions Evidences of arbitrary arrests and incommunicado detention often resulting in disappearances, and summary executions, are cited in the 1990 report of AI which pointed out that over 1,000 people, including prisoners of conscience, were arrested after martial law was imposed in Lhasa in March and that some of them were summarily executed. It also pointed out that evidences of persistent human rights violations in Tibet continued to come to light in 1989, including reports of numerous arbitrary arrests, long-term detention without charge or trial, and torture. Under Chinese rule in Tibet, there is no question of informing prisoners of the grounds for their arrest and their right to legal remedies. Arrest warrants are rarely issued or produced. Grounds for arrest and imprisonment seem to be found in any kind of activity: Tibetans have been arrested for speaking with foreigners, or singing patriotic songs, or putting up wall posters, or possessing copies of an autobiography of the Dalai Lama or some video or audio cassette on him, or for preparing a list of casualties during Chinese crackdown on demonstrations, or for plotting and advising friends to wear the traditional Tibetan costume on Chinese national day. Incommunicado detention is almost routine. Often it is left to the device of the relatives of the arrested person to locate him or her. [Defying the Dragon: China and Human Rights in Tibet, LAWASIA and TIN, London, March 1991, p. 33] A person taken into custody is declared arrested only after a period ranging from several days to months, or even years. During the period of the initial detention there is no question of informing the family since he is legally not arrested. Torture In Tibet, torture is the only known and expected method of interrogating prisoners. China's signing of the Convention Against Torture on 12 December 1986, and its supposed coming into force at the end of 1988, did not alter the trend. Methods and instruments of torture and ill-treatment have been described by a number of former prisoners who had been subjected to them. These include indiscriminate beating with anything available on hand such as electric batons, kicking, punching, hitting with rifle-butt, stick, and even iron bar. In prison, cruel and degrading methods of torture for the purpose of extracting confessions have been reported. These include setting of guard dogs on prisoners, use of electric batons especially on women prisoners in extremely perverted and degrading manners, inflicting cigarette burns, administration of electric shock, etc. One recent refugee from eastern Tibet, who was a member of the Chinese Public Security Bureau, described thirty-three methods of torture of prisoners. New methods of torture are being constantly devised and this has been acknowledged in at least one internal party document in Tibet. [To Control Others, First Control Yourself, H'o Phan in TAR Internal Party Study Document, in Tibetan, issue No. 2, September 1989, p. 21 ff.] Lack of due process In the Chinese legal system the most basic safeguard the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt does not exist. Sentences imposed on political prisoners are often atrociously high in comparison to the degree of the alleged offence. Prisoners are often detained for an extended period without charges and are seldom brought before a court of law. Administrative detention is imposed by police or local authorities without supervision by an independent judiciary. The police have wide powers to impose periods of administrative detention varying from a few days to several years without any judicial review. Though China's Administrative Procedure Act provides for a right to appeal, it is made practically impossible to use it. There is no right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, or the right to be tried in an open court. Defence argument, when permitted, is restricted to appeal for mitigation of punishment, not for pleading innocence. The role of the judges are restricted to passing sentences determined by the political authorities. It is not surprising, therefore, that Tibetans refer to the judges only as sentencing officers. Freedom of movement In flagrant violation of Article 13 of UDHR, China has imposed a series of rules restricting free movement of Tibetans within their own country. People have to be registered at a particular place where alone they are entitled to reside and buy food ration. Going from one place to another for any purpose, even for a short duration, requires official permission. There had been many occasions when Tibetans have been expelled from Lhasa to their native villages. It occurred when China was preparing to celebrate the 40th anniversary of annexation of Tibet on 23 May 1991. Following the crackdown on the demonstrations of 5-7 March 1989, 40,000 Tibetans were expelled from Lhasa to their native villages. In August 1992, the Chinese authorities expelled around 6,000 Tibetans, homeless as well as pilgrims, from the ground behind eastern Lhasa's hospital. The ground is now occupied by Chinese office buildings and shops. International attention on human rights violations China claims that its PLA entered Tibet to liberate it stands starkly exposed by the 1960 report of the International Commission of Jurists on Tibet. The report states that China committed systematic violations of human rights in Tibet, including acts of genocide [see 1960 ICJ Report]. Three UN Resolutions in 1959 [UNGA Res. 1353 (XIV)], 1961 [UNGA Res. 1723 (XVI)] and 1965 [UNGA Res. 2079 (XX)], calling on China to respect the human rights of Tibetans, including their right to self-determination, reinforced the findings of the Commission. Government and parliamentary supports More recently, a number of countries passed parliamentary resolutions on Tibet calling on the Chinese Government to respect the human rights of the Tibetan people. Among them are the European Parliament (14 October 1987, 15 March 1989 and 25-26 April 1990), West Germany (15 October 1987), Italy (12 April 1989), Australia (6 December 1990), 6 June 1991), etc. The United States' Senate and the House of Representatives together passed more than 10 resolutions calling on China to respect the political and human rights of the Tibetan people. On 28 October 1991, the US President, George Bush, signed into law a Congressional Resolution declaring Tibet an Occupied country under established principles of international law, whose true representatives were the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government as recognized by the Tibetan people. Similarly, many Governments expressed their concern directly to the Chinese Government. Concerns at the situation in occupied-Tibet was also raised by parliamentarian support groups of various countries, such as India (27 April 1989), Austria (24 May 1989), Australia (9 March 1989), Switzerland (16 March 1989), etc. Tibet at the UNO in recent years In 1985 the human rights situation in Tibet was, once again, discussed at the United Nations. Various non-governmental organisations called on the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to address the human rights situation in Tibet. Since then, Tibet figured prominently at various human rights fora of the UNO and at almost all the succeeding sessions of the UNCHR and its sub-commissions. At the 46 sessions of the UNCHR in February 1990, Governments, including those of the EC, the US, Canada, Sweden and Australia addressed the issue of Tibet. Statements on discrimination, self-determination and on martial law by NGOs were also published by the UN. Various other committees and organs of the UNO and sub-committees held detailed hearings on the human rights situations in Tibet and evasive Chinese responses were consistently criticised. These included the fourth session of the Committe Against Torture in April 1990 and the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. On 23 August 1991, the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities passed the Situation in Tibet Resolution (1991/10), expressing concern at continuing reports of violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms which threatened the distinct cultural, religious and national identity of the Tibetan people. Ironically this seems to confirm Mao's dictum that a just cause always receives many supporters. Myth of Tibetan self-rule In its White Paper, China claims that under the democratic reform in 1959" it introduced the new political system of people's democracy"; and that the Tibetan people have become masters of the country. Nothing could be further from the truth. Though the TAR is claimed to be autonomous, Tibetans have little or no say in running their own affairs. Final decision-making power has always been held by the Chinese Communist Party through its TAR Regional Party's First Secretary who has always been a Chinese: In 1959, it was Zhang Guhua; he was followed successively by Tseng Yun Ya, Ren Rong, Yin Fatang, Wu Jinhua, Hu Jintao and Chen Kuiyuan. Even the highest Tibetan officials, like Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, cannot make any decisions without consent of their Chinese subordinates. They are not even allowed to stay in Tibet: visits are made only to fulfil Chinese Government needs and purposes. Such restrictions were especially applied to the movement of the late Panchen Lama. At all so-called democratic meetings, pre-determined proposals of the concerned Chinese Communist Party body are tabled only to be praised and approved by show of hands. Making criticisms, amendments or alternative suggestions are impermissible profanities. The pre-determined outcome of such a meeting is then declared to be democratic decision of the people. Whatever may be the position a Tibetan occupies in the Chinese hierarchy in Tibet, he always has a junior Chinese official under him who exercises the real power. In most important offices, such as the so called TAR Economic Planning Department and the Personnel Department, Chinese officials and clerical staff far outnumber Tibetans. As regards the so-called elected deputies of the people, all candidates are pre-determined by the concerned Chinese leaders. After the voting the winners are again chosen by the same authorities who had selected the candidates. And the population of about a half of Tibet, merged into neighbouring Chinese provinces, have been completely deprived of their political identity and rendered an insignificant minority of electorates in their own land. Chapter 6. Socio-economic conditions and colonialism Introduction The price Tibet paid for this development was higher than the gains. This was the Panchen Lama's last verdict on three decades of Chinese rule in Tibet. Year after year, the Chinese Government claims great economic advancement in Tibet: bumper crops, industrial growth, improvement of infrastructure and so forth. These claims were made even when Tibet was suffering its only famines in the nation's recorded history (1961-1964, and 1968-1973). Later, the Chinese Government admitted the disastrous effects of certain economic and social policies forced upon the Tibetan people. Given China's record in Tibet, two things must be borne in mind when assessing social and economic developments in Tibet: the first is that the Chinese Government claims cannot be taken at face value. Even official statistics appear to be drawn up to prove a particular political point rather than to present an objective picture of the situation. Secondly, evidence shows that it is not the Tibetans who benefit from the economic development of Tibet. The primary beneficiaries of China's new open economic policy are the Chinese settlers in Tibet, their Government and military, and their business enterprises. One Chinese leader who had the honesty and courage to admit the failure of Chinese policies to bring improvement in life of Tibetans was Hu Yaobang, former Communist Party Secretary. During his visit to Tibet in June 1980, Hu publicly acknowledged that Tibetans had not benefited from the much-vaunted Chinese assistance. He visited Tibetan families in several communes, including one called Anti-Imperialist Commune. Disgusted by the abject poverty of Tibetans, he called a meeting of top functionaries of the TAR and demanded to know if all the financial assistance earmarked for Tibet had been thrown into the Yarlung river. He complained that, contrary to Chinese propaganda claims, living standards of Tibetans had gone down since 1959, and that the large Chinese presence in Tibet, particularly of government cadres was an obstacle to development. He immediately announced that steps should be taken to raise the standard of living to pre-1959 levels in three years, and withdraw 85 percent of Chinese cadres. The TAR Party Secretary, Yin Fatang, summed up Hu's impressions of Tibet as a region steeped in poverty and backwardness (Red Flag, No. 8, 1983). The hiatus between China's claim and the true condition in Tibet is easier to understand if one realises that Chinese rule in Tibet is essentially colonialist in nature. In colonial times, it was quite common for the colonial power to be making lofty claims about the economic and social progress it brought to the backward colonies. In many cases it was true that economic development did occur, but the native population contributed more to the realisation of profits for the colonial power and its business entrepreneurs than it ever got in return. In fact, one of the characteristics of colonialism is the exploitation of the colony for the primary benefit of the colonial power. That, today, is also the case in Tibet. Socio-economic reform from 1949 onwards Soon after the invasion of Tibet, China imposed far-reaching collectivisation programmes. Nomads, like farmers, had all their herds confiscated and themselves divided into brigades and communes. The nomads tended their herds with no right to the product of their labour; the same case applied to farmers. They survived each year on an average diet of 5 or 6 pounds of butter, 10 pounds of meat and 4 or 5 khel (a khel is between 25 - 30 pounds) of tsampa. In the periods 1961-1964 and 1968-1973, famines became widespread in Tibet's pastoral areas. Thousands upon thousands of Tibetans had to survive on rodents, dogs, worms and whatever they could forage for living. In 1979 the new Chinese leadership set in motion a policy of liberalisation. This brought in its wake a programme of decollectivisation which has improved the conditions in Tibet to some extend. However, things are far from satisfactory even today. With an estimated per capita income of $80 in 1990, an adult literacy rate of 21.7 per cent and an average life expectancy of 40 years, TAR scores just 0.087 on the UNDP's Human Development Index for 1991. This would theoretically place it between Chad and Djibouti at position 153 out of the world's 160 nations. The Chinese authorities also recognise these facts. Speaking in Beijing at the third meeting of the 7th Session of the Chinese National People's Congress in March 1990, the Chairman of the TAR People's Government, Dorje Tsering, said that Tibet (Autonomous Region) was still a very poor region with a per capita income of only about 200 yuan. An increase in the number of beggars is a stark reminder of economic problems faced by Tibetans. On the fifteenth day of the Sakadawa (Fourth month of the Tibetan calendar) in 1992, when the father of Ms. Drokyi from Sok Dzong gave alms of 5 fen (100 fen = one yuan) to each beggar in Lhasa town, he handed out 500 yuan without covering half the number of beggars. In its White Paper, China again claims that its rule has brought great prosperity, and vast social, political and cultural benefits to the Tibetan people. It complains that its civilising mission in Tibet is costing the Government and people of China large amounts in terms of subsidies to an under- developed region. According to official Chinese statistics, the level of annual subsidies to the TAR in the late 1980s was around one billion yuan or US $270 million. What the Chinese Government would not say is that it has earned more from Tibet than it has given. In monetary terms, the volume of Tibetan timbers taken to China far exceeds the amount of financial assistance it claims to have given. This, of course, does not take into account the vast mineral resources such as uranium, gold, silver, iron, copper, borax, lithium, chromite, etc, as well as priceless art treasures, carted away to China. In any case, the bulk of China's financial subsidies goes towards maintenance of Chinese personnel in Tibet. It also serves as incentives for Chinese settlers. The Tibetans benefit very little from it. This becomes clear when one studies the deep urban-rural divide in subsidies. During the late 1970s and early 1980s an average subsidy of $128 was spent on every town-dweller, and only $4.50 on each rural inhabitant. The urban areas of the TAR are dominated by Chinese settlers and personnel, who form overwhelming majorities in major towns like Lhasa, Nyingtri, Gyangtse, Nagchukha, Ngari, Shigatse, Tsethang, Chamdo, etc. The Tibetan population, on the other hand, is concentrated mainly in rural areas. Therefore, in the ultimate analysis, the vast bulk of China's subsidies is meant to support the majority urban-living Chinese population and their associated infrastructures. Even the items subsidised are those that are consumed by the Chinese rather than Tibetans. The staple diet of Tibetans is barley (for tsampa), though urban or richer families add wheat and sometimes rice to their diet. However, it is only the price of rice and wheat which is subsidised. These form the stable diet of the majority Chinese settlers. By 1985, the price of barley was left to market forces and was 76 fen a kg. Rice, on the other hand, was sold at 40 fen a kg after being bought by the Government at 90 fen a kg; wheat sold at 44 to 48 fen a kg after being bought at 112 to 126 fen a kg (UNDP 1986). This pattern of subsidy makes living in the TAR more attractive to Chinese settlers while at the same time making it harder for poorer Tibetans to survive in the way to which they were once accustomed. Timber and mining industries are other areas that not only receive large chunks of China's financial assistance, but are also among the most important employers of Chinese immigrants in Tibet. The products of these industries are carted away to China. Tibetans, on the other hand, are marginalised and have little control over their own natural resource base. Take the case of road construction. The primary objective of constructing roads in Tibet is to deploy occupying forces like the PLA, along with defence materials, and immigration of Chinese, as well as to exploit the natural resources of Tibet like forests and minerals, which are transported primarily to China. Roads may run through most Tibetan villages, but a public transport system is almost non-existent in the majority of rural Tibet. The Chinese modern means of transport do not benefit the majority of Tibetans. In some villages, buses do carry people once a week. But the passengers are all cadres. Tibetans in most p